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Abstract 
 
 The aim of the present study was to provide context for understanding how set-shifting 
relates to personality and behavioral characteristics in a normal sample of college students. Set-
shifting has generally been defined as the ability to efficiently switch mental tasks, or more 
broadly, to think flexibly. While many studies have previously focused on set-shifting in samples 
of individuals with psychopathology, no study had examined how set-shifting functions in a 
normal sample. In the current study, 191 undergraduate men and women were assessed using the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task – 64 card version (WCST-64), the Brixton task, the Trail Making 
Test (TMT) Parts A and B, and the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI). Self-report measures 
captured level of depressive, anxiety, eating disorder, and obsessive-compulsive 
symptomatology, perfectionism, systemizing, dietary restraint, emotion regulation, and five 
factors of personality (agreeableness, extraversion, emotional stability, conscientiousness, and 
intellect). Following examination of the full sample, individuals with elevated eating disorder (n 
= 27), anxiety (n = 82), and depressive (n = 45) symptomatology were considered separately. 
Bivariate correlations indicated only negligible correlations between many of the measures of 
set-shifting across samples. Associations between the independent variables and the measures of 
set-shifting were diverse, with some associations in a direction consistent with hypothesized 
relations between set-shifting and the independent variables, some showing a complex pattern 
apparently dependent upon degree of symptomatology, and several demonstrating a set of 
correlations opposite to the predicted model. The diversity in these findings underscores the 
necessity of additional research focusing on precisely defining set-shifting and examining the 
extent to which current tools can be considered appropriate measures of this variable. 
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Introduction 
Set-Shifting 
 Demands from our constantly changing environment often require us to flexibly switch 
task, or our attention, quickly and efficiently. The importance of this ability has led researchers 
to examine the underlying cognitive process or processes responsible for this skill. In recent 
years, psychologists have turned toward neuropsychological tasks to provide objective and 
quantifiable data on such cognitive patterns. One neuropsychological variable representative of 
this flexibility is set-shifting, or the ability to move mentally between multiple tasks or rules 
(Roberts, Tchanturia, Stahl, Southgate, & Treasure, 2007). For example, while cooking dinner, 
one might need to alternate attention between chopping vegetables, boiling water, and attending 
to a child. In this case, our environment requires us to intentionally carry out a series of tasks 
with specific procedures, or a “task-set” (Monsell, 2003). This happens repeatedly throughout a 
person’s day, and the flexibility required by these sorts of shifts is helpful in functioning 
efficiently in many environments.  
 Historically, clinical neuropsychology focused on brain injury, with the size and location 
of the injury being of primary importance to the goal of treating the injury (Bigler, 1988). 
Specifically, set-shifting was typically utilized in diagnosing patients with frontal lobe damage 
(Graham et al., 2009).  For example, research on the cognitive profiles of high-altitude 
mountaineers who have been exposed to prolonged hypoxia indicates that set-shifting deficits are 
present and associated with reduced grey matter density in brain areas involved in motor activity, 
as well as dysfunction in the prefrontal cortex (Di Paola et al., 2008; Regard, 1989). With the 
advent of neuroimaging, the utility of neuropsychological tools has shifted from damage 
localization to describing cognitive and behavioral changes associated with the injury.  
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As the localization of brain damage began to be integrated with behavioral and cognitive 
changes, neuropsychological measures have become more compelling to those studying 
psychopathology, offering tools to better understand the brain-behavior bases for multiple 
disorders. Set-shifting has often been included in this category, as the neuropsychological 
concept seems to translate well into clinical terms. Poor set-shifting is associated with the sort of 
rigidity, narrow focus, and inflexibility seen in many disorders (Abbate-Daga, Buzzichelli, 
Marzola, Amianto, & Fassino, 2014; Danner et al., 2012; Giel et al., 2012; Holliday, 2005; 
Johnson, 2009; McAnarney et al., 2011; Roberts, Tchanturia, Stahl, Southgate, & Treasure, 
2007; Shott et al., 2012; K. Tchanturia et al., 2012). As will be seen in future sections, this has 
informed the conceptualization of several disorders and sparked research on treatment modules 
that target set-shifting specifically. Set-shifting, then, has become an informative and useful 
variable for those studying and treating psychopathology. 
Despite the increasing research on set-shifting in clinical populations, surprisingly little is 
known about this variable and its correlates in a normal population. It seems clear that set-
shifting should generally be conceptualized as a dimensional construct; it would be incorrect to 
categorize someone as either proficient or deficient at set-shifting. Rather, set-shifting ability is 
likely better characterized as a matter of degree on a spectrum from complete inability to highly 
skilled. Patients with brain damage or psychopathology may represent the extreme end of the 
spectrum, but there is little understanding of what this variable looks like in its non-extreme 
forms. It can be hypothesized that certain degrees of set-shifting ability would be related to 
particular personality characteristics and aptitudes for certain careers or pursuits. Thus, a general 
knowledge of how set-shifting can be described in a normal population is of potential use; yet, 
no study has linked set-shifting to these concepts. It remains unclear whether set-shifting is 
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associated with varying degrees of personality dispositions or behavioral tendencies. This 
framework is necessary to more fully understand the construct of set-shifting and the role that it 
plays in daily life. This study will attempt to fill part of that gap.  
Of particular interest in this project is the relationship between set-shifting and the eating 
disorders, and associated behavioral and personality characteristics. Impaired set-shifting has 
been proposed as an endophenotype of eating disorders and particularly anorexia nervosa (AN), 
meaning that it is being considered as a behavioral manifestation with a genetic basis that is 
heritable and stable. Numerous studies have found evidence for set-shifting deficits in samples of 
eating disorder patients (Holliday et al. 2005; Tchanturia et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2014).  It has 
been hypothesized that poor set-shifting can contribute to the development and maintenance of 
eating disorders (Roberts, Tchanturia, & Treasure, 2010; Shott et al., 2012; K. Tchanturia et al., 
2011), and this seems to be consistent with clinical observations that patients with eating 
disorders tend to be rigid and persistent (Shott et al., 2012). Conceptually, dysfunctional set-
shifting can be hypothesized to be a predisposing trait.  This pre-existing rigidity may make 
dieting particularly attractive because of its rule-bound nature. The singular intention of losing 
weight may also be appealing to someone with the tendency to narrow one’s focus toward a 
particular goal while ignoring conflicting information.  Poor set-shifting ability may also 
facilitate the maintenance of eating disorders. A deficit in set-shifting would likely limit one’s 
ability to attend to properties of a food that do not fit the person’s current characterization of it as 
“good” or “bad” and would make it difficult for patients to incorporate foods into their diet 
which had previously been categorized as “bad”. It would also hinder adding variety to typical 
food and eating routines. Additionally, a patient with AN spends a great deal of time and 
attention restricting caloric intake; the difficulty of losing weight necessarily forces weight loss 
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to become the central goal of the person’s life. A neuropsychological characteristic that makes 
one prone to rigidly focus attention toward a specific goal without attention to other stimuli and 
feedback would facilitate ignoring physiological cues to eat in favor of the goal of restriction.  
This might also make one more likely to ignore the negative consequences of the eating disorder.  
Importantly, results have not demonstrated set-shifting deficits in all patients with eating 
disorders (Andres-Perpina et al., 2011; Shott et al., 2012); thus, the conceptualization of impaired 
set-shifting as an endophenotype of eating disorders may not be fully appropriate. Instead, it may 
be better thought of as a predisposing trait for general psychopathology. Renwick et al. (2014) 
examined the neuro- and socio-cognitive profiles of patients with AN and found three patterns 
with respect to set-shifting: 1) a subgroup with a strength in WCST, 2) a subgroup with average 
WCST perseverations, and 3) a subgroup with a weakness in WCST performance. This suggests 
that set-shifting deficits are not a one-size-fits-all characteristic for patients with AN. The studies 
that fail to find these deficits in patients with eating disorders make it clear that poor set-shifting 
is not characteristic of all individuals with eating disorders, but an explanation for why this 
deficit is so pronounced in only certain patients is unknown. Researchers have examined the 
personality characteristics associated with set-shifting deficits in patient populations (Abbate-
Daga et al., 2014; Lindner, Fichter, & Quadflieg, 2014; Pignatti & Bernasconi, 2013), but it is 
difficult to assess how much weight to give these associations in a clinical population when we 
do not know the extent of these relationships in a non-clinical population. This study will attempt 
to better understand how set-shifting is related to personality and behavioral characteristics, such 
as perfectionism and obsessionality, that are often associated with eating disorders. The 
examination of behavioral and personality traits associated with set-shifting in a college-student 
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sample will help in better understanding the nature of the relationship between set-shifting and 
eating disorders. 
Measuring Set-Shifting 
One problem facing researchers studying set-shifting is a lack of consensus surrounding 
terminology, and whether varying terminology is indicative of different constructs. Although the 
term “set-shifting” is often used interchangeably with terms like task-shifting and attention-
shifting, Ravizza and Carter (2008) propose a difference between the terms set-shifting and task-
shifting. They define a set shift as one that requires an attentional set change, or a change in 
attention towards a different property of the stimulus relevant for the task. For example, 
switching between reporting the color and the shape of a stimulus requires an attentional shift. 
They contrast this with task-shifting, or a change in the goal of the task. They provide the 
example of classifying a digit as odd or even; in this task, the participant is attending to the same 
property of the stimulus but the goal (i.e., report it as odd, or report it as even) changes. They 
acknowledge, however, that these two ideas are not easily parsed out. For example, one could 
treat the color/shape task as an attentional shift because the task repeats (consistently reporting 
the property of the stimulus) while the relevant stimulus property (color or shape) changes. 
However, one could also argue that the task is changing because the goal in one trial is to attend 
shape and ignore color, and the goal of the next trial is to attend color and ignore shape. This 
difference is not easily defined in experimental designs. The goal of this paper is not to flesh out 
the appropriate definitions for these terms, but rather to examine the role that the ability to switch 
attention, goal, or rule flexibly and efficiently plays in healthy populations. Nonetheless, this 
difference in terminology is a reminder that cognitive processes rarely break down into simple 
tasks, making them challenging to study.  
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Set-shifting has been measured using a number of different tasks, and many of these 
assess varying components of set-shifting. An understanding of the paradigms frequently used to 
measure set-shifting ability is necessary before examining findings related to set-shifting ability, 
as some of the discrepancies seen in results can likely be attributed to the fact that these tasks 
often measure different aspects of set-shifting. The multidimensionality of set-shifting and the 
impact that this has on research will be explored more thoroughly in later sections. 
 In many set-shifting paradigms, participants perform a single task on each trial. In some 
trials, the task changes (switch trial), whereas in others, the task remains the same (repeat trials) 
(Kiesel et al., 2010). The participant’s performance in the switch trials is compared to 
performance in the repeat trials. Generally, there is a switch cost, or worse performance, in 
switch trials. This can be measured in reaction time and in error rates (Kiesel et al., 2010). Many 
of the first studies on set-shifting involved switching the task every trial (ABAB), and comparing 
this to performance on single-task blocks (AAA and BBB) (Kiesel et al., 2010). One of the first 
researchers to formally capture this ability was Jersild (1927). His experimental design required 
participants to perform one arithmetic task with a list of numbers, or to alternate between two 
arithmetic tasks with a list of numbers. Participants took longer to complete the mixed-task 
blocks (ABAB) than the single-task blocks (AAA and BBB) (Kiesel et al., 2010). Kiesel et al. 
(2010) indicate, however, that this type of design conflates working memory with set-shifting, as 
the participant is required to keep the rule for both sets in mind during the mixed-task block. 
Although other designs have been developed, this idea of conflation with other cognitive 
processes will continue to be an issue in measuring set-shifting. Further designs capturing set-
shifting include alternating-runs paradigms, in which a task switches after a regular number of 
trials (AABBAABB) (Kiesel et al., 2010). A task-cuing paradigm involves a random order to 
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switches and repetitions. To instruct the participant which task to perform, a cue either precedes 
or accompanies the stimulus (Kiesel et al., 2010). In an intermittent instructions paradigm, 
participants perform a sequence of trials under the same task and are then interrupted at random 
times by a cue informing them to perform a different task for the following sequences (Kiesel et 
al., 2010). A recent experimental design involves voluntary task selection, in which the 
participant decides which task to perform in each trial. Despite the voluntary decision to switch 
tasks, switch costs are still associated with this type of task (Kiesel et al., 2010). 
 One paradigm frequently used to measure set-shifting is a card sorting task. The 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) can be administered using a computer or pen and paper. It 
involves participants sorting cards based on the color of the card, the shape on the card, or the 
number on the card. There is a particular sorting rule that the participant has to decipher, and 
feedback is provided to the participant during the task to indicate whether the correct rule is 
being used. Once the participant has learned the rule, the rule switches; this pattern repeats 
several times. The switch cost is typically measured using perseverative errors, or the continued 
use of an obsolete rule (Grant and Berg, 1948).   
The Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery’s (CANTAB) Intra/Extra 
Dimensional Set Shift task is considered theoretically similar to the WCST. This task involves 
two types of stimuli: colored shapes and white lines. Initially, the participant sees two colored 
shapes and guesses which one is correct. The computer provides feedback, and after six correct 
responses, the rule changes (Robbins, 1998).  
The Trail Making Test Part B is another frequently used measure for set-shifting. In this 
task, participants are handed a paper with numbers and letters in circles placed randomly on a 
page. The participant is asked to draw a line alternating between numbers and letters in 
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ascending order. The time to complete this task is then compared to an easier version in which 
there are only numbers on the page (Reitan, 1958; Sanchez-Cubillo et al., 2009).  
The CatBat task involves a short written story with missing words. The participant must 
determine whether “cat” or “bat” fills in the blank most appropriately (Eliava, 1964; Tchanturia 
et al., 2004). The outcome measure is based on the number of incorrect choices the participant 
makes. Finally, the Haptic Illusion task involves three wooden balls: two equally sized and 
small, and one larger. Initially, the larger ball and one of the smaller balls are placed in the 
participant’s hands (one right, one left), and the participant is asked to judge which is larger. 
After several trials, the experimenter replaces the larger ball with the second smaller one. Most 
participants will experience the illusion that the ball in the hand previously holding the larger 
ball is smaller (Tchanturia, Davies, & Campbell, 2007; Uznadze, 1966). These tasks will be 
discussed in more detail in further sections, but this initial understanding of the ways in which 
psychologists measure set-shifting will allow for a better understanding of the difficulties that 
arise in quantifying set-shifting. 
Several self-report measures of cognitive flexibility have also been constructed and 
validated, but do not tend to show convergent validity with the above neuropsychological 
measures of set-shifting. Johnco, Withruh, and Rapee (2014) measured the reliability and 
validity of two such self-report measures: the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI) and the 
Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS). These measures include items that have face validity for 
cognitive flexibility (i.e., from the CFI: “I consider multiple options before making a decision,” 
“I like to look at difficult situations from many different angles”). They reported good internal 
consistency for both measures, but mixed convergent validity with the neuropsychological tasks, 
including the WCST, TMT, Controlled Oral Word Associations Test, the Stroop Color-Word 
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Associations Test, and the Ruff Figural Fluency Test. The CFI Total score had small but 
significant correlations with the Stroop Test (r = .43), the TMT-B (r = .31), the COWAT (r = 
.41), the RFFT unique designs (r = .25), and WCST perseverative errors (r = .23). The CFS 
showed less convergence. Additionally, in a clinical sample, both scales showed less statistically 
significant convergence, but still showed small effect sizes in certain tasks (WCST: r = .28). 
Many factors could have limited the ability to detect statistically significant correlations, 
including a limited sample size. Still, one would expect that the self-report measures would show 
stronger correlations with the neuropsychological tasks if they were truly capturing the same 
construct.  
Further evidence for the discrepancy between self-reported cognitive flexibility and 
neuropsychological measures of set-shifting was provided through Dennis and Vander Wal 
(2010)’s description of the development and validation of the CFI; this scale was designed to 
measure “the type of cognitive flexibility necessary for individuals to successfully challenge and 
replace maladaptive thoughts with more balanced and adaptive thinking” (p. 241). It is intended 
to measure the tendency to perceive difficult situations as controllable, the ability to recognize 
multiple explanations for events and behavior, and the ability to generate several solutions to 
problems. The authors point out that the degree of similarity between these characteristics of 
cognitive flexibility and the neuropsychological assessments for set-shifting is uncertain. They 
offer the explanation that the neuropsychological measures of set-shifting might measure a type 
of flexibility that is more trait-like, and perhaps indicative of brain abnormalities. The self-report 
measures for cognitive flexibility, on the other hand, are more state-like and affected by 
emotions. Additionally, as will be further discussed in later sections, different 
neuropsychological tasks intended to measure set-shifting capture varying dimensions of set-
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shifting (Tchanturia et al., 2004); the fact that these neuropsychological tasks might not be 
capturing the same concept makes it less surprising that they do not show convergent validity 
with self-report measures. The CFI appears to have good face validity for mental flexibility, but 
does not appear to have items that capture perseveration, or the persistent use of a rule despite 
negative feedback for the use of that rule. Many studies of set-shifting use the perseveration total 
from the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task as one of the main outcome variables. It seems, then, that 
the two methods of measuring cognitive flexibility might truly be capturing different constructs. 
The possibility also exists, however, that we do not have accurate insight into our own set-
shifting ability, or perhaps these scales produce reactive responses such that participants are 
motivated to seem more flexible than they truly are; this would make self-report an invalid 
method for measuring set-shifting. 
Set-Shifting: Construct Definitions and Operationalizations  
As previously noted, inconsistencies seen in the nature of set-shifting could be related to 
investigators’ treatment of a multidimensional variable as a unidimensional construct. Although 
set-shifting has been argued to consist of multiple component abilities, it is typically treated as a 
single concept; cross-study comparison of different components of set-shifting is likely 
inappropriate. Tchanturia et al. (2004) used factor analysis to discriminate between four factors 
of set-shifting: simple alternation, mental flexibility, perseveration, and perceptual shift. In 
samples of patients with AN, bulimia nervosa (BN), and healthy controls, the investigators used 
a battery of assessments intended to capture set-shifting ability and found that they loaded in 
different ways into these four factors. The outcome measures that loaded onto each factor help in 
understanding the conceptual differences among the factors. Simple alternation consisted of the 
number of errors and total time on the Trail Making Task Part B and the Brixton total number of 
errors, and the authors suggest that it represents correct rapid alternation between sets. Mental 
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flexibility included the CatBat time to completion and the number of repetitions on a verbal 
fluency task. The authors do not hypothesize a possible conceptual basis for this factor, but 
perhaps it is indicative of flexibility under time constraints. The perseveration factor included the 
number of errors on the CatBat task and the number of errors on a visual set task. Again, the 
authors offer no conceptual hypothesis for this factor, but it can be thought of as representing the 
persistent use of an obsolete rule. Finally, the perceptual shift task contained only the Haptic 
illusion task. Further research is needed to better understand the differences between these 
factors and the tasks that load onto them.  
Several other studies have similarly found that set-shifting deficits were dependent upon 
the specific component of set-shifting analyzed. Fitzpatrick, Darcy, Colborn, Gudorf, and Lock 
(2012) examined set-shifting in a sample of adolescents with AN, and designed the 
neuropsychological battery they used to represent several components of set-shifting: motor and 
visual set-shifting, verbal set-shifting, and verbal inhibition and set-shifting. Heled, Hoofien, 
Bachner-Melman, Bachar, and Ebstein (2014) found that currently ill and weight restored 
patients with AN had deficits in sorting tasks involving a visuo-spatial component, but no 
deficits in sorting tasks requiring verbal ability. This lends support to the idea that part of the 
reason for discrepancies reported in studies of set-shifting could be the use of disparate 
conceptualizations of set-shifting. Without either a clear and comprehensive definition of set-
shifting or an analysis that includes all possible components of set-shifting, cross-study 
comparison is difficult. 
It seems evident that the findings on set-shifting ability are also at least partly dependent 
on the operationalization of the concept. As previously discussed, there are numerous paradigms 
to measure set-shifting, and the application of these operationalizations to studying set-shifting in 
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a sample of patients with eating disorders illustrates how the specific task used affects the 
outcome. Several studies that operationalized set-shifting using the WCST found set-shifting 
deficits in a sample of patients with AN, whereas studies using the CANTAB have not found 
such a deficit (Roberts et al., 2007). Furthermore, the effect sizes have varied in magnitude in 
studies using the TMT, the WCST, the CatBat Task, and the Haptic Illusion task (Roberts et al, 
2007). In their meta-analysis of studies measuring set-shifting in patients with eating disorders 
and obesity, Wu et al. (2014) found varying effect sizes based on the type of neuropsychological 
assessment used; the TMT and the WCST had a Hedge’s g that would be considered medium, 
whereas the Haptic Illusion task had a large Hedge’s g and the 
Intradimensional/Extradimensional set-shifting task of the CANTAB was non-significant. It 
seems reasonable, then, to conclude that these tasks are not equivalent, or are measuring different 
constructs.  
Set-Shifting or Another Process? 
Previously, the difficulty of parsing out specific cognitive processes involved in a single 
task was noted. The implications stemming from this are discussed in several articles. Wildes, 
Forbes, and Marcus (2014) argue, for example, that the perseverative errors outcome on the 
WCST can represent two neurocognitive processes: “(1) attentional set-shifting, i.e., the ability 
to shift attention away from one abstract stimulus dimension (e.g., color) toward another (e.g., 
shape); and (2) reversal learning, i.e., the ability to override a recently acquired stimulus-
reinforcement association (e.g., matching based on color) to apply a new stimulus-reinforcement 
association (e.g., matching based on shape)” (p. 227). They argue that this distinction is 
important because these two processes also have distinct neural correlates that substantiate their 
differences. 
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Wu et al. (2014) also note the possibility that inconsistencies among findings using 
different set-shifting tasks may be related to the conflation of set-shifting with other cognitive 
abilities. For example, many of the tasks used often require performance monitoring in addition 
to set-shifting (Wu et al., 2014). Wu et al. (2014) define monitoring as the process of 
“interpreting task-relevant cues and feedback signals appropriately to guide adaptive behavior” 
(p. 3378). Although this might be the case, there are insufficient data to conclude with 
confidence how significantly other cognitive abilities impact a person’s performance on these 
tasks. Robbins et al. (1998) performed a factor analysis of subtests of the CANTAB to determine 
whether the individual subtests are truly separate. They found that their measure of set-shifting, 
the Intra/Extradimensional Task, loaded completely onto its own factor; however, other tasks 
intended to measure set-shifting loaded with tasks meant to represent problem-solving. The 
authors suggest that set-shifting functions probably contribute to efficient problem solving; 
however, the exact nature of the relationship between set-shifting and problem solving could not 
be determined. The investigators provided evidence that neuropsychological measures may not 
purely measure one cognitive process; the intercorrelations of many cognitive processes make it 
difficult to know to what extent other abilities might impact set-shifting. Similarly, O’Donnell, 
MacGregor, Dabrowski, Oestreicher, and Romero (1994) used factor analysis to determine the 
loadings for several neuropsychological tasks. They found that the TMT-B and several other 
tasks loaded onto an attentional focus and psychomotor speed dimension, lending support to the 
idea that the TMT is another neuropsychological task that requires more than set-shifting ability. 
Until the contributions of each cognitive process to performance on neuropsychological tasks are 
parsed out, it is impossible to determine precisely what is being measured.  
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Gender, Age and Set-Shifting 
Minimal information is available regarding gender differences in set-shifting ability, and 
the studies that have examined this relationship often have conflicting results. In a cross-
sectional sample of forty-nine healthy participants aged 8-30, Kalkut, Han, Holdnack, and Delis 
(2009) did document statistically significant effects of gender on set-shifting abilities, with 
women performing better than men. Additionally, there were age by gender interaction effects, 
indicating that men’s and women’s development of set-shifting follow different courses. This 
interaction term predicted more variance in set-shifting than IQ, age, and gender alone. The 
authors suggest that this may be related to pubertal changes, as men tend to “catch up” to 
women’s performance later in life. The authors also acknowledge that this finding only adds to 
inconsistent findings from other studies that have failed to show any gender differences. Lowe 
and Reynolds (1999), for example, failed to find any effect of gender on set-shifting in an older 
population. Without a better understanding of how gender is to related set-shifting ability, it 
seems unlikely that researchers and clinicians will be able to understand the determinants and 
consequences of set-shifting.  
Few studies examining the pattern of set-shifting in clinical samples include gender as a 
variable. Many studies have explored the relationship between set-shifting and eating disorders, 
but the majority of these studies excluded males from their samples. In their recent meta-analysis 
of studies examining set-shifting in patients with eating disorders and obese patients, Wu et al. 
(2014) reported that only 4 of 54 studies included male participants. The studies examining set-
shifting in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder either did not report the gender make-up 
of their samples or included much smaller samples of men than women (Chamberlain et al., 
2006; Chamberlain et al., 2007).  
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Evidence on the relationship between age and set-shifting has demonstrated that set-
shifting ability may decline past the age of 50; evidence for a relationship between age and set-
shifting until that point has been inconsistent (Fitzpatrick et al., 2012; Lang, Stahl, Espie, 
Treasure, & Tchanturia, 2014; McAnarney et al., 2011; Robbins, 1998). Robbins et al. (1998) 
measured a battery from the CANTAB in healthy participants aged 21 to 79 years. They found 
that their measure of set-shifting was the only subtest in the battery to be related to age. Young 
participants (<55 years) were found to perform significantly better than older participants (>55 
years). They also point to consistency between this finding and other studies of decline in WCST 
performance between the ages of 50 and 59. Many of the studies examining set-shifting in 
psychopathology, however, have an age range that does not include adults over 50 years old; 
thus, these studies might not find evidence of the relationship that Robbins et al. (1998) 
demonstrated.  Studies examining the relationship between age and set-shifting in samples of 
patients with eating disorders, for example, tend to focus on the difference between adolescents 
and adults. Lang et al.’s (2014) meta-analysis of studies examining set-shifting ability in children 
and adolescents with AN concluded that set-shifting deficits found in adult patients with AN are 
not pronounced in a similar sample of children and adolescents; the differences between 
adolescents with AN and adolescent healthy controls were non-significant and yielded small 
effect sizes. This could indicate that set-shifting deficits seen in adult AN patients are resulting 
from the duration of the disorder, or it could be interpreted as evidence of a relationship between 
age and set-shifting. If set-shifting ability is not fully developed until later adolescence, the 
differences between ill and healthy adolescents’ set-shifting may not be pronounced.  
Some of the inconsistency seen in studies examining age and set-shifting might also be 
partially explained by the use of varying operationalizations of set-shifting. As previously 
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discussed, the number of paradigms for operationalizing set-shifting can prove problematic when 
attempting to compare studies. Fitzpatrick et al. (2012) found mixed set-shifting deficits in 
adolescents with AN. They obtained no significant differences between healthy controls and 
adolescents with AN on any tasks, but the effect size for the differences between the groups 
varied based on the task: TMT, Verbal Fluency, WCST perseverative errors all showed a small 
effect size, but WCST categories completed showed a medium effect size (d=.46), as did the 
Brixton raw score (d=.40). The fact that the differences between these two groups were not 
statistically significant could be due to the study’s small sample size (32 adolescents, 22 healthy 
controls). Further evidence for the presence of set-shifting deficits in adolescent AN patients is 
provided by McAnarney et al. (2011). The investigators did find significant differences with 
medium to large effect sizes between a healthy control group and a sample of adolescent patients 
with AN on the WCST total errors and total perseverations scores; however, they did not find 
significant differences on the CANTAB Intra/Extradimensional shifting task and the effect size 
for this difference was small.  Taken together, these findings suggest an age effect on at least 
certain components of set-shifting, but this relationship requires further exploration.   
Medication’s Impact on Set-Shifting 
The inconsistency in studies’ exclusion criteria for psychotropic medication also makes it 
difficult to compare findings across them. Wu et al. (2014) reported that, out of their sample of 
54 studies, 11 reported participants with no psychotropic medication use, 17 included patients 
taking selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor medications, and smaller numbers of studies 
included patients taking low-dose antipsychotic medication and benzodiazepine treatments. 
Billingsley-Marshall et al. (2013) report this limitation for their study of executive function in 
patients with AN, noting that this not only increases individual variability but also introduces a 
confounding variable because antipsychotics and benzodiazepines have been shown to alter 
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cognitive performance on many tasks. The specific impact of psychotropic medications on the 
cognitive processes involved in set-shifting is currently unknown. A sample of non-clinical 
participants would allow researchers to examine the variables affecting set-shifting ability in the 
absence of psychotropic medications.  
Set-Shifting and the Five-Factor Personality Model 
 Although the structure of personality has been debated among personality psychologists, 
it is beyond the scope of this project to outline the many theories on the structure of personality. 
The 1980s saw more convergence towards the Five-Factor model of personality; this 
dimensional model incorporates both normal and abnormal personality traits and considers these 
traits to exist on a spectrum (Costa & McCrae, 2014). These factors broadly assess chronic 
propensity towards extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability or 
neuroticism, and openness or intellect (Costa & McCrae, 2014). The dimension represented by 
extraversion has been considered to measure the extent to which an individual is energetic and 
group-oriented versus solitary. Agreeableness captures a spectrum with strong levels of trust and 
kindness towards others at one end and competitiveness at the other. Conscientiousness reflects 
degree of fastidiousness, ranging from extremely disciplined to generally careless. Neuroticism 
or emotional stability represents the degree to which an individual chronically experiences 
emotional distress. Openness or intellect is considered the extent to which an individual takes a 
curious and imaginative approach versus one that is more traditional or pragmatic (Cost & 
McCraw, 2014).  
The nature of any relationship between set-shifting and these personality traits has yet to 
be examined. Despite the scant research base from which to draw hypotheses, the conceptual link 
between certain of these characteristics and set-shifting can be speculated. For instance, those 
people who are generally open to new experience and have preferences for novelty may have 
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greater set-shifting ability. Additionally, there may be a link between neuroticism and set-
shifting insofar as those who have higher levels of neuroticism experience more emotions that 
are hypothesized to negatively affect set-shifting (i.e., depression and anxiety). This study will 
explore whether any of these five factors are related to set-shifting ability. 
Set-Shifting and Depression 
The nature of set-shifting ability in patients with depressive disorders has been examined 
in several studies. Clinically, a deficit in set-shifting can be seen as a predisposing and 
maintaining factor in depression. A cognitive predisposition to ignore contrary evidence and only 
attend using the rules one has already developed might lead someone to fail to see indications 
that he or she is a generally good and successful person, and could contribute to the “all or none” 
thinking that is often seen in patients with depression. Set-shifting deficits may also help 
maintain the disorder by keeping patients in their negative framework for interpreting events and 
information, with resistance to contrary evidence. Patients with depression who are resistant to 
changing the framework they use to interpret events may be considered to be inflexible in their 
cognitive style.  
Patients with unipolar depression do generally show impairment in set-shifting, although 
it remains unclear whether the severity of depressive symptoms impacts this relationship (Austin 
et al., 2001). These deficits do tend to persist after recovery, lending support to the hypothesis 
that impaired set-shifting is a predisposing trait for depression. However, the possibility remains 
that these deficits could be the long-term result of recurrent depressive episodes. Grant, Thase, 
and Sweeney (2001) found that patients with major depressive disorder completed fewer 
categories on the WCST (d=-.42), had increased perseveration (d=0.48), and poor maintenance 
of set (d=0.51). Yet, there was no evidence of set-shifting dysfunction on the CANTAB 
Intra/Extradimensional task, controlled oral word association test (COWAT), or the TMT, again 
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underscoring the point that not all set-shifting tasks are equivalent. Additionally, it is notable that 
this study did not exclude patients with comorbid anxiety, eating, or substance use disorders, nor 
did they quantify the symptoms associated with these diagnoses; this makes it difficult to know if 
the differences in set-shifting were due to depressive symptoms and makes cross-study 
comparison more challenging. Similarly, Merriam, Thase, Haas, Keshavan, and Sweeney (1999) 
used the WCST and found that patients with major depression made more perseverative and 
nonperseverative errors (d=0.72 and d=-.42), took longer to reach the first category in the WCST 
(d=0.42), and completed fewer categories overall than the control group (d=0.49). Notably, this 
study included only patients who had been unmedicated for at least 28 days. Once again, it is 
clear that varying exclusion criteria are problematic for cross-study comparison.  
Further evidence regarding the nature of the relationship between set-shifting and 
depressive symptoms is perhaps provided by studies of set-shifting in patients with eating 
disorders. However, caution should be used in interpreting scores on depression inventories in 
samples of currently underweight patients. As described in Keys, Brozek, Henshel, Mickelon, 
and Taylor (1950), one of the consequences of starvation is depression; in studies with samples 
of currently underweight patients, it is unclear whether the depression being measured results 
from starvation, and whether that is qualitatively different from major depressive disorder. In 
these studies, authors tended to measure depressive symptoms in the patients and either correlate 
the scores from the measure of depression with set-shifting ability, or use the measure of 
depression in partitioning the variance of set-shifting ability. Results from these studies are 
remarkably mixed, with some investigators finding a relationship between depression and set-
shifting in patients with AN and others failing to find such a relationship. These studies will be 
discussed in further detail in later sections.  
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After reviewing the literature on the nature of the relationship between set-shifting and 
depression, it seems that deficits in set-shifting generally can be associated with increases in 
depression; however, variability across different measures of set-shifting are again evident. The 
neuropsychological task used impacts the conclusions drawn, as studies using the WCST 
consistently report deficits in set-shifting whereas those using the Brixton task do not. The 
impact of psychotropic medications is also unclear and undoubtedly introduces variance. 
Additionally, the measure of depression likely impacts the studies’ findings. Interestingly, the 
picture of this relationship when examining a singular diagnosis of depression seems to change 
when measured in samples of patients with eating disorders. As will be seen in later sections, the 
evidence for a relationship between set-shifting and depression is more varied in samples of 
patients with eating disorders. This might be evidence that set-shifting deficits are a predisposing 
trait for general psychopathology, or a consequence of multiple symptom patterns. An 
understanding of the relationship between these variables in a non-clinical sample would help in 
better characterizing the relationship in a clinical population. 
Anxiety, Obsessionality, and Set-Shifting 
The only studies of set-shifting in the context of anxiety disorders focus on obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD). It is unclear why other anxiety disorders have not been examined. 
Future sections will explore the nature of the relationship between anxiety and set-shifting in 
samples of patients with eating disorders, but further investigation of this relationship in samples 
of patients with anxiety disorders would be of value. A cognitive tendency to ignore evidence 
contrary to one’s current belief system would seem to be a potential predisposing and 
maintaining factor in phobias and generalized anxiety disorder. 
The notion of poor set-shifting fits well into the clinical picture of OCD. Longitudinal 
research is needed to better understand at what point cognitive rigidity appears, but it is 
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hypothesized to contribute to the development and maintenance of OCD. A cognitive 
predisposition towards focusing one’s attention towards a particular characteristic of a stimulus 
may facilitate the development of the obsessions seen in patients with OCD. Additionally, it 
would seem likely that a cognitive tendency to persist in following a rule despite negative 
feedback about that rule would help maintain a disorder clinically characterized by rigid 
adherence to compulsions despite negative consequences. 
Several studies have examined the nature of the relationship between obsessionality and 
set-shifting in patients with OCD. Chamberlain et al. (2006) used the Yale-Brown Obsessive 
Compulsive Scale to measure obsessionality in patients diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD). Patients with OCD required significantly more trials in the Extradimensional 
component of the Intradimensional/Extradimensional Shift Task, indicating a set-shifting deficit 
when compared to healthy controls (r=.29). The authors note that this portion of the task is 
similar to what would be required in the WCST. Notably, this did not correlate with severity of 
symptoms. In a similar study Chamberlain et al. (2007) used the Yale-Brown Obsessive 
Compulsive scale to measure set-shifting ability in patients with OCD and their first-degree 
relatives without an OCD diagnosis. Both patients with OCD and their relatives required more 
trials at the Extradimensional shift stage of the Intradimensional/Extradimensional Shift Task 
when compared to healthy controls (patients: r= 0.41; relatives: r= 0.45). Again, this did not 
correlate with severity of symptoms in the patient group. The presence of this deficit in healthy 
first-degree relatives also provides evidence that set-shifting deficits are relevant in a non-clinical 
population. The evidence thus far seems to indicate that deficits in set-shifting are associated 
with increases in obsessionality. 
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Eating Disorders and Set-Shifting 
Set-shifting has been studied fairly extensively in samples of patients with eating 
disorders. As previously discussed, the notion that a deficit in set-shifting is present in this 
population of patients fits well into the conceptualization of the development and maintenance of 
these disorders. A deficit in set-shifting could support the tendency of many patients with AN to 
have strict and unyielding rules surrounding food. Such a deficit could also aid in the narrow-
mindedness required to make restriction one’s central goal. However, not all studies have found 
such deficits. It is important to consider that these studies provide evidence that dysfunctional 
set-shifting is not common to all patients with eating disorders. In particular, set-shifting is more 
characteristic of patients with AN than patients with other eating disorders (Galimberti, Martoni, 
Cavallini, Erzegovesi, & Bellodi, 2012).   
Studies of patients with AN can also provide evidence for the nature of a relationship 
between set-shifting and depression, set-shifting and anxiety, and set-shifting and obsessionality. 
As previously noted, these studies are, in certain ways, difficult to interpret because of the 
substantial impact of starvation (Keys et al., 1950). Comorbidities in patients with eating 
disorders can arise as a result of the starvation, and thus may be qualitatively different from 
major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Thus, studies examining the relationship between set-shifting and depression, anxiety, and 
obsessionality in samples of patients with eating disorders may not be measuring the same 
construct as a study that examines these associations in samples of patients without eating 
disorders. Nonetheless, these studies may be informative of the characteristics of set-shifting in 
samples of patients with comorbidities. Holliday et al. (2005) used the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale to capture depression in patients with AN and control patients. Their analysis 
revealed no correlation between depression and participants’ set-shifting ability when measured 
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by the CatBat task, Brixton test, or the TMT. However, the number of perceptual illusions 
measured by the Haptic Illusion Task was positively correlated with depression scores (r=0.27). 
Again, it becomes clear that the tool used to measure set-shifting matters. Giel et al. (2012) set 
out to explicitly examine the relationships between unipolar depression, eating disorders, and set-
shifting. They used the TMT, WCST, and a Go/No-Go Test to indicate set-shifting ability. They 
found that patients with unipolar depression performed significantly more poorly in all three 
tasks when compared to patients with AN, and their performance on the TMT was more 
impaired than that of healthy controls. Giel et al. (2012) also reported a moderately negative 
correlation between severity of depressive symptoms and set-shifting. The authors conclude that 
impaired set-shifting in patients with eating disorders may actually be due to comorbid 
depressive disorders.  
Contrary to Giel et al. (2012) and Holliday et al. (2005), several studies have found that 
depressive symptoms in patients with eating disorders were unrelated to set-shifting ability 
(Shott et al., 2012; Steinglass et al., 2006; Tchanturia et al., 2004). Roberts, Tchanturia, and 
Treasure (2010) used the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, and a composite score from 
AN and BN participants’ performance on the TMT, the WCST, the Brixton Task, and the Haptic 
Illusion task as an overall indicator of set-shifting. They found that self-reported depression was 
weakly correlated with this composite score (r<.08). This may reflect a true absence of 
association between set-shifting and depression in patients with AN or BN, or may result from 
their methodological choices. Their method of measuring set-shifting does capture more than one 
aspect of the construct, but the investigators artificially dichotomized the sample into two 
groups: poor set-shifting and intact set-shifting. Through this process, they might have lost 
valuable information about differences between the neuropsychological tasks. Shott et al. (2012) 
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used a structured interview to determine if a diagnosis of depression was appropriate and found 
no relationship between depression diagnosis and the measure of set-shifting ability in their 
sample of adolescents with AN. Steinglass et al. (2006) and Tchanturia et al. (2004) similarly 
found no relationship between scores on depression scales and any measurement of set-shifting 
in samples of patients with AN and BN.  
Similarly to depression, studies examining the nature of set-shifting deficits in samples of 
patients with eating disorders often include anxiety as a variable; these studies, then, may also 
help clarify whether a relationship between anxiety and set-shifting exists in samples of patients 
with eating disorders. Research findings on the possible relationship between anxiety and set-
shifting seem to show relatively consistently that there is no significant relationship between 
these two variables within samples of patients with eating disorders. Holliday et al. (2005) used 
the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale to measure anxiety symptoms in their sample of 
patients with diagnosed eating disorders. They found that anxiety was not significantly related to 
the CatBat task, the Brixton task, or the Trail Making Test. Lindner et al. (2014) similarly failed 
to find a relationship between scores on the Beck Anxiety Interview and set-shifting ability in a 
group of patients recovered from AN and in a control group. Additional authors have reported 
similar findings (Roberts, Tchanturia, & Treasure, 2010; Shott et al., 2012; Tchanturia et al., 
2004).  In a study of patients with AN, however, Billingsley-Marshall et al. (2013) found that 
state anxiety predicted scores on the Ruff Figural Fluency Test (R2=.124) and the COWAT 
(R2=.124), measures of spatial and verbal set-shifting.  Cross-study comparison might be 
complicated by the difference between state and trait anxiety; Billingsley-Marshall et al. (2013) 
purposely studied state anxiety, whereas other authors often fail to discuss whether they are 
attempting to capture state or trait anxiety. 
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Although the aforementioned studies converge in their conclusion that anxiety is not 
related to set-shifting in patients with eating disorders, several studies report results indicating 
such a relationship may exist in healthy populations. Talbot et al. (2014) examined whether set-
shifting can be accurately thought of as an endophenotype of AN. They included the Depression 
Anxiety Stress Scales to capture anxiety, and operationalized set-shifting with the WCST, the 
Matching Familiar Figures Test, and the Rey Complex Figure Task. Their findings indicated that 
anxiety was associated with fewer categories achieved in the WCST in the healthy control group 
(r=-.34); this was not found in the patients with AN. However, there was also a negative 
relationship between anxiety and number of perseverative errors in the healthy control group (r=-
.32), indicating that increases in anxiety resulted in fewer perseverative errors, underscoring the 
importance of including multiple aspects of set-shifting. Johnson (2009) examined emotional 
attention set-shifting in a normal college sample utilizing the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and a 
task that required participants to switch between a neutral and an emotional mental set. They 
found that trait anxiety moderated neutral-to-emotional switch costs, meaning that those 
participants higher in trait anxiety and worry were less able to switch from a neutral to an 
emotional set. Notably, emotional attention set-shifting is a different operationalization of set-
shifting from that which has previously been discussed in this paper. Nonetheless, this finding 
emphasizes the importance of considering the multifaceted nature of set-shifting and specificity 
in defining which aspect of set-shifting will be considered. Taken together, these studies indicate 
that there are certain circumstances in which a relationship between set-shifting and anxiety can 
be found. 
As was seen in patients with eating disorders and a comorbid anxiety diagnosis, patients 
diagnosed with eating disorders and comorbid obsessionality symptoms do not seem to express a 
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relationship between obsessionality and set-shifting. Danner et al. (2012) used the Yale-Brown 
Obsessive Compulsive Scale to measure obsessionality in patients with anorexia nervosa and 
found no significant relationship between the variables of interest (r= -.06). Lindner, Fichter, and 
Quadflieg (2014) used the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory and found no significant 
relationship between obsessionality and set-shifting. However, patients with an OCD diagnosis 
were explicitly excluded, perhaps causing a restricted range; restricted range on any variable can 
mask the true nature of the relationship between the variables. Additionally, the investigators 
only used one measure of set-shifting. This could have caused prevented them from capturing the 
full nature of the participants’ set-shifting abilities; as has previously been seen, varying tasks 
measuring set-shifting seem to operationalize different components of set-shifting ability. 
Further studies of obsessionality in patients with eating disorders have failed to find a 
relationship between these two variables (Roberts, Tchanturia, and Treasure, 2010; Talbot, Hay, 
Buckett, and Touyz, 2014; Tchanturia et al., 2004).  
Contrary to these studies, Holliday et al. (2005) did find a positive correlation between 
obsessionality as measured by the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory and the number of 
perceptual illusions measured by the Haptic Illusion Task in a sample of patients with AN and 
their healthy sisters (r=0.27, p=.002). Obsessionality was also positively correlated with total 
response time on the TMT (r=0.26, p=.004). The inconsistency seems to result from several 
factors, all of which have also been noted in relation to anxiety, depression, and 
operationalization of set-shifting. There is inconsistency in the measurement of set-shifting and 
obsessionality, and the exclusion criteria vary between studies. Additionally, the sample sizes for 
many of these studies include fewer than 30 participants in each group. Most noteworthy is that 
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it is once again evident that deficits in set-shifting are not unique to one form of psychopathology 
and can also be seen in non-clinical samples. 
Many of the studies that fail to find a relationship between anxiety and set-shifting, 
depression and set-shifting, and obsessionality and set-shifting are those that measure anxiety, 
depression, and obsessionality as a comorbid condition in patients with eating disorders. This is 
an important distinction that might lend support to the idea that set-shifting deficits are a 
predisposing variable for general psychopathology, rather than one specific disorder. If this is the 
case, the interpretation of set-shifting as an endophenotype of eating disorders specifically is 
inappropriate. However, as previously noted, comorbidities in patients with eating disorders are 
unique in that they can arise from starvation conditions. This makes it less clear whether the 
anxiety, depression, and obsessionality seen in patients with eating disorders are truly congruous 
with the anxiety, depression, and obsessionality seen in other patients. An understanding of the 
personality and behavioral correlates of set-shifting ability in a non-clinical population will be 
useful in helping to determine the nature of the relationships between set-shifting and anxiety, 
depression, and obsessionality. 
Dietary Restraint 
Dieting is considered a significant risk factor for developing an eating disorder (Fairburn, 
2005), and it is plausible to hypothesize that some aspects of persistent dieting behaviors are 
related to set-shifting deficits.  Dietary restraint, or the conscious control of caloric intake for 
weight loss or to prevent weight gain, has been researched extensively. Several authors have 
argued that dietary restraint can be separated validly into two categories: rigid control and 
flexible control dieting (Green, Rogers, Elliman, and Gatenby, 1994; Westenhoefer, 1991; 
Westenhoefer, Stunkard, and Pudel, 1999). Westenhoefer (1991) hypothesized that restrained 
eaters all attempt to restrict food intake, but use different behavioral strategies for accomplishing 
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this. His data supported the hypothesis that some employ rigid control techniques, characterized 
by a dichotomous approach to dieting, while others adopt a less deliberate approach to dieting, 
termed flexible control. Westenhoefer (1991) explains that these flexible control dieters may 
count calories, but do not take smaller portions or compensate for eating a “forbidden” food. The 
attempt for behavioral rigidity found in rigid control dieters might be associated with a deficit in 
set-shifting. Research has shown that those higher in flexible control dieting differ significantly 
from those higher in rigid control dieting in depression, eating disorder symptoms, and anxiety 
(Stewart, Williamson, & White, 2002).  Timko and Perone (2005) examined the relationship 
between the style of dietary restraint, body mass index, and disinhibition. They reported that 
women with high rigid control tended to have higher BMI and higher disinhibition, with the 
reverse relationship for those women high in flexible control. In men, however, flexible control 
was not related to BMI or disinhibition, although rigid control was still associated with high BMI 
and high disinhibition. Green, Rogers, and Elliman (1994) examined cognitive differences 
between restrained nondieters, current dieters, and non-restrained nondieters. They found that 
restrained nondieters did not differ from non-restrained nondieters in measures of vigilance, 
reaction time, or immediate memory. However, they did not examine restraint subtypes or set-
shifting in particular. As yet, no studies have examined the relationship between rigid or flexible 
control dieting and set-shifting. Given the characterization of rigid control and flexible control 
dieting, it seems likely that these constructs may be related to general cognitive flexibility, as 
characterized by set-shifting. 
Perfectionism and Set-Shifting 
 Perfectionism is often clinically associated with the same type of rigidity that is thought 
to reflect deficits in set-shifting ability. Flett and Hewitt (2006) define perfectionism as a strong 
need for achievement. They distinguish between positive and negative perfectionism, noting that 
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high levels of organization, high personal standards, and self-oriented perfectionism are 
characteristic of positive perfectionism, whereas negative perfectionism is characterized by 
neuroticism, dissatisfaction, and socially prescribed perfectionism. They articulate the idea that 
negative perfectionism results from a fear of failure. They also carefully distinguish between 
conscientiousness and perfectionism: “We believe that the term perfectionist should be reserved 
for those individuals who hold rigidly to their standards, even in situations that do not call for 
perfection, and who continue to place an irrational importance on the attainment of impossibly 
high standards in not just one but in several life domains” (p. 476). Using this definition of 
perfectionism, it can be hypothesized to be associated with the rigidity that is characterized by 
impaired set-shifting. 
One scale commonly used to measure perfectionism is the Frost Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale, which includes six subscales: Concern over Mistakes, Personal Standards, 
Parental Expectations, Parental Criticism, Doubts about Actions, and Organization (Stober, 
1998). Within these subscales, the differentiation between positive and negative, or adaptive and 
maladaptive, perfectionism can be seen (Lindner, Fichter, and Quadflieg, 2014). When studies 
examining set-shifting use this scale to capture perfectionism, they often report an overall score 
and correlate this overall score with set-shifting. Individual subscale scores, however, should 
yield a better understanding of the relationship between set-shifting and specific components of 
perfectionism. One of the few studies to report both overall and subscale scores on perfectionism 
in a sample of patients with eating disorders was conducted by Lindner, Fichter, and Quadflieg 
(2014). They used the WCST to measure set-shifting, and found that the categories achieved on 
this task had a significant positive association with overall perfectionism in participants who had 
recovered from AN (r=.21, p<.05); however, this index was negatively correlated with overall 
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perfectionism in the healthy control group (r= -0.21, p<.05). In the healthy control group, overall 
perfectionism showed a significant positive relationship with the number of perseverations 
(r=0.29, p<.01); in the recovered patient group, there was a significant negative relationship 
between perfectionism and the number of perseverations (r= -0.23, p<.05). Thus, recovered AN 
patients with higher overall perfectionism achieved more categories and made fewer 
perseverations, whereas in healthy control participants, perfectionism was associated with fewer 
categories achieved and more perseveration. The Parental Expectations subscale was associated 
with the measures of set-shifting (categories achieved: r= -0.21, p<.05; perseverations: r=.25, 
p<.05; shift cost: r= -0.21, p<.05) in the control group, but did not correlate with set-shifting in 
the recovered group. The Personal Standards subscale was strongly associated with set-shifting 
in the recovered patient group (categories achieved: r= 0.28, p<.05; perseverations: r= -0.25, 
p<.05; shift cost: r= 0.33, p<.01). Concern Over Mistakes and Doubts about Actions were 
significantly associated with set-shifting in both groups, but in opposite directions. These 
differences are, perhaps, the opposite of what one might expect, as perfectionism is generally 
thought to be maladaptive in psychopathology. It seems possible that the recovered patient group 
might have displayed a different profile from the healthy control group because of treatment. 
Perhaps treatment addressed some of the negative aspects of perfectionism, and thus changed the 
nature of the perfectionism and set-shifting relationship for these patients. Unfortunately, no 
other study was found that gave a detailed profile of perfectionism and set-shifting in currently 
ill patients. Future studies should attempt to capture the components of perfectionism to provide 
a better understanding of how these facets are connected to set-shifting in both clinical and non-
clinical samples. 
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 Several studies have failed to find a relationship between set-shifting and perfectionism 
in samples of patients with eating disorders; this may genuinely reflect an absence of relationship 
between set-shifting and perfectionism, but methodological choices in these studies may have 
also affected their results. Abbate-Daga et al. (2014) compared patients with AN to healthy 
controls using the perfectionism subscale of the Eating Disorders Inventory and the WCST. They 
dichotomized set-shifting within the patient group, and found that both patients with intact and 
those with poor set-shifting had higher levels of perfectionism than healthy controls. However, 
there was no difference in perfectionism between the intact and poor set-shifting patient groups. 
Yet, when the authors dichotomized the set-shifting variable, they could have lost variability and 
thus diminished the capability of seeing the relationship between set-shifting and other variables. 
Similarly, Roberts, Tchanturia, and Treasure (2010) dichotomized set-shifting in a study 
comparing patients with AN or BN, women recovered from AN, unaffected sisters of women 
with AN and BN, and a healthy control group. They did, however, report a small effect size 
(Cohen’s d=0.21) indicating that as perfectionism increases, set-shifting decreases. The authors 
do not discuss the possible reasons why this effect size might have failed to reach statistical 
significance; again, this may reflect a true absence of relationship between perfectionism and set-
shifting, or it may be due to study design. They do have a large sample size, but perhaps the 
dichotomization of set-shifting reduced the variability and prevented the differences between the 
intact and poor set-shifting groups from reaching statistical significance. We see an inconsistent 
picture of the relationship between set-shifting and perfectionism, possibly due to 
methodological choices, including artificial dichotomization and choices in operationalization, or 
perhaps due to differences in the relationship in varying populations. 
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Emotion Regulation 
 Although there have been few studies examining the relationship between emotion 
regulation and set-shifting, studies that have examined these variables do tend to report a 
relationship. Cognitive reappraisal is one emotion regulation strategy that entails changing the 
meaning of an emotional situation to elicit a different emotional response (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, 
John, and Gross, 2012). This could be related to set-shifting in that those who find it difficult to 
think flexibly may have a harder time reappraising the meaning of a stimulus. McRae, Jacobs, 
Ray, John, and Gross (2012) assessed set-shifting in a community sample. The authors used a 
global/local task in which participants were shown a series of large letters composed of smaller 
letters. The color of the large letter would cue the participant which letter to attend to, with some 
trials characterized by non-switching and others characterized by switching. They 
operationalized emotion regulation using the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, and were 
interested in the use of cognitive reappraisal specifically. They found a small positive correlation 
(r=0.23) between reappraisal and set-shifting cost, indicating that those participants who used 
reappraisal strategies tended to take longer to shift set, and interpreted this finding as evidence of 
an overall more cautious strategy in response. At present, data on a possible relationship between 
set-shifting and emotion regulation remain scant. 
Systemizing and Set-Shifting 
 Systemizing is defined as the desire to construct a system that follows rules; these 
systems can be technical, natural, abstract, motoric, taxonomic, or social (Lawson, Baron-Cohen, 
and Wheelwright, 2004; Wakabayashi, Sasaki and Ogawa, 2012). Lawson, Baron-Cohen, and 
Wheelwright (2004) further explain that emotions and mental states are largely irrelevant to 
these systems. Through these systems, it becomes possible to predict the behavior of the 
variables involved. Although there have yet to be studies examining the link between 
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systemizing and set-shifting in a healthy population, the two variables seem likely to be related; 
the paucity of research examining whether there is a link between set-shifting and systemizing is 
surprising. One could imagine that individuals higher in systemizing would be resistant to 
unexpected rule changes. Perhaps research has not been conducted in this particular area because 
this is a characteristic that is not necessarily dysfunctional. In career paths like science and 
mathematics, this sort of systemizing tendency can be advantageous. However, the same can be 
said of perfectionism, making it more difficult to understand why research on the relationship 
between set-shifting and systemizing has not been conducted.  
Some evidence relevant to a putative relationship between systematizing and set-shifting 
can be found in studies examining the neurological profile of patients with autism spectrum 
disorders. Spek (2011) examined local information processing in participants with Asperger’s 
syndrome, participants with high-functioning autism, and a neurotypical control group. They did 
not find any differences between the groups in neuropsychological performance, nor did they 
find any correlations between the self-report measures of systemizing and the 
neuropsychological tasks, but they did not include a task specific to set-shifting. Rinehart, 
Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton, and Tonge (2001) specifically investigated the ability to switch from 
local to global processing in patients with high-functioning autism and Asperger’s, and found 
deficits in shifting ability in patients with high-functioning autism. Further studies have provided 
evidence for a deficit in set-shifting in patients with high-functioning autism (Hughes, Russell, & 
Robbins, 1994; Kaland, Smith, & Mortensen, 2007), but further research is needed to 
demonstrate whether there is a relationship between systemizing and set-shifting.  
Hypotheses 
Exploration of the personality and behavioral traits associated with set-shifting in a 
college-student sample will aid in our understanding of set-shifting in general. This study will 
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examine the nature of the relationship between set-shifting and depression, anxiety, 
perfectionism, obsessionality, dietary control, emotion regulation, systemizing, and self-reported 
cognitive flexibility. Despite a lack of research on set-shifting in a normal population, studies of 
clinical populations provide some data from which to draw hypotheses. Depression, 
obsessionality, rigid dietary control, and systemizing are predicted to be negatively correlated 
with set-shifting ability, such that increases in these variables are associated with deficits in set-
shifting ability. Additionally, dimensions of perfectionism representing parental expectations, 
doubts over actions, concerns over mistakes, and parental criticism are expected to be associated 
with deficits in set-shifting. The personal standards and organization dimensions of 
perfectionism, however, are expected to be positively associated with set-shifting ability. 
Anxiety is hypothesized to have no relationship with set-shifting. Cognitive reappraisal as an 
emotion regulation strategy is expected to be associated with longer times to shift set, but more 
accuracy in shifting set. There is expected to be no significant relationship between self-report 
measures of cognitive flexibility and general set-shifting ability. Further analysis will examine 
whether there are any gender differences in set-shifting ability, and whether gender moderates 
any of the relationships between set-shifting and the aforementioned variables. Not enough 
previous research has been conducted on possible gender differences to allow a base from which 
draw hypotheses, making this analysis purely exploratory. 
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Methods 
Participant Recruitment 
Participants for this study were recruited through the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. All 
students enrolled in introductory psychology classes had the option to participate in research on 
campus for credit towards their grade; this study appeared as one of their options. Additionally, 
short presentations on this research were given to undergraduate level courses, many of which 
provided extra-credit opportunities for research participation. Once recruited, participants met 
with a research assistant or the principal investigator to review the informed consent document. 
Regulatory approval was obtained through the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa’s IRB.  
Participants 
 For the purpose of obtaining a representative sample of college students, inclusion and 
exclusion criteria were limited. To be considered eligible for the study, participants were 
required to speak English fluently and be between 18 to 40 years of age. There is mixed evidence 
for a decline in set-shifting ability in older adults. Few older adults were expected to be recruited, 
eliminating the possibility of having enough variance to include age as a variable; thus, including 
older adults would have only added to individual variability. This age range was also selected to 
be inclusive and representative of the typical age range seen at the University of Hawai‘i at 
Mānoa. Although participants were asked whether they currently had a diagnosis of or were 
being treated for an eating disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, or severe depression (see 
Appendix A), those who respond affirmatively were not excluded. The goal of this study was to 
examine the correlates of set-shifting in a general college population, which includes individuals 
with psychological disorders. 
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Procedures 
 Participants signed up to participate through the University’s research organization tool, 
Sona. After reviewing and signing the consent forms, all participants first completed the self-
report measures not relating to cognitive flexibility online. Once scheduled for the 
neuropsychological assessment, half of the participants completed the self-report cognitive 
flexibility assessments first and half completed the neuropsychological measures first. It was 
unclear whether completing the neuropsychological set-shifting tasks might impact self-report on 
cognitive flexibility, and this design choice made it possible to examine whether such an effect 
might have been present. The self-report assessments were computer-based.  The principal 
investigator or a trained research assistant administered all neuropsychological tasks in a 
standard order. 
Measures 
Demographics. Participants were asked to report their age, gender, years of education 
completed, and race. Response options for race can be found in Appendix A. The participants 
were also asked whether they had been diagnosed with or were receiving treatment for an eating 
disorder, depression, or obsessive-compulsive disorder. The demographic questionnaire can be 
found in Appendix A. 
 
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI) (Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). Dennis and Vander 
Wal’s (2010) CFI was developed to measure components of cognitive flexibility that allow 
individuals to think adaptively in response to stressful life events. They hypothesized that three 
components contribute to this ability: “(a) the tendency to perceive difficult situations as 
controllable; (b) the ability to perceive multiple alternative explanations for life occurrences and 
human behavior; and (c) the ability to generate multiple alternative solutions to difficult 
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situations” (p. 243). Conceptually, this can be thought of as similar to mental flexibility. This 
scale is unlikely, however, to be representative of perseverative errors. The items are presented 
as declarative statements, and respondents indicate their degree of agreement with a 7-point 
Likert scale response. 
 Dennis and Vander Wal (2010) tested the CFI’s reliability and validity in a sample of 196 
undergraduates from a private Midwestern university. The 20 items load onto two factors: an 
alternatives subscale and a control subscale. Both subscales showed adequate Cronbach’s alpha 
(Alternatives: Time 1=0.91, Time 2=0.91; Control: Time 1=0.86, Time 2=0.84). The measure 
also had high 7-week test retest reliability (r=0.81, p<.001). Convergent validity was 
documented through correlations with the Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS) at time 1 (r=.73, 
p<.001) and time 2 (r=.75, p<.001). Convergent validity was also supported through examining 
correlations between the CFI and a measure of adaptive coping; at both time 1 and 2, small to 
medium correlations were found between the CFI and problem-focused coping (r=.48 and .49, 
p<.001), seeking social support (r=.32 and .32, p<.001), and focusing on the positive (r=.39 and 
.32, p<.001). The authors also present support for concurrent validity through correlations with 
the Beck Depression Inventory-2 (r = -.39, p<.001), with greater cognitive rigidity on the CFI 
associated with higher scores on the BDI-2. Johnco, Wuthrich, and Rapee (2014) demonstrated 
small correlations between the CFI and certain neuropsychological tasks in a sample of geriatric 
patients (TMT-B: r=.306, p<.01; WCST perseverative errors: r=.227, p<.05; Controlled Oral 
Word Association Test [COWAT]: r=.411, p<.001; Stroop: r=.430, p<.001). 
 
Additional Cognitive Flexibility Questions. Several questions were added to the CFI in an 
attempt to operationalize cognitive flexibility as it was measured by the neuropsychological 
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tasks; these questions were predicted to be more highly associated with the neuropsychological 
outcomes utilized in this study. They were intended to reflect ability to perceive rules and adapt 
to changes in those rules; this is closely related to what was expected of patients completing the 
WCST and the Brixton task. In this way, we could examine whether participants were insightful 
about these abilities specifically. Participants used the same 7-point Likert response scale as was 
used on the CFI. These included the following questions:  
• I have noticed that I easily pick up a rule for how something should be done. 
• When the rules change, I’m not always quick to change. 
• I persist in using rules for thinking about or categorizing something, despite feedback that 
it might not be correct. 
• I have an easy time changing tasks quickly. 
 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). Zigmond and 
Smith (1983) designed the 14-item HADS to detect anxiety and depression in patients in non-
psychiatric hospital settings. Although the present sample did not include medical patients, this 
scale was appropriate in that it was designed for patients who do not have an existing psychiatric 
diagnosis. In initial validation of the scale, Zigmond and Snaith (1983) assessed 50 patients and 
obtained two factors: anxiety and depression. Additionally, they sampled 100 patients to 
determine the accuracy of the scale in detecting anxiety and depression; for the depression 
subscale, the rate of both false positives and false negatives was 1%; for the anxiety scale, the 
false positive rate was 5% and the false negative rate was 1%. 
 Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, and Neckelmann (2002) conducted a literature review to consider 
the current validity and reliability of the HADS. They found that the correlations between the 
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two factors (HADS-A and HADS-D) varied from .40 to .76. The high correlation is, perhaps, not 
surprising given the high comorbidity between anxiety and depression. Across studies, HADS-A 
was found to have adequate internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha between .68-.93), as was 
HADS-D (Cronbach’s alpha between .67-.90). Sensitivity and specificity when using a cutoff of 
8+ were in the range of 0.70 to 0.90. When correlated with other common measures of anxiety 
and depression, such as the Beck Depression Inventory, the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, and 
the SCL-90 Anxiety and Depression subscales, the correlations were between .60 and .80. 
Bjelland et al. (2002) concluded that the scale performs well in assessing anxiety and depression 
in somatic, psychiatric, and primary care patients, and in the general population.  
 
Beck Depression Inventory, second edition (BDI-2) (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI 
and the BDI-2 were designed to measure the presence and severity of depression in patients with 
a psychiatric diagnosis, as well as in normal populations of adolescents and adults (Dozois, 
Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998). The BDI-2 is a 21-item scale, with each response rated on a four-
point scale. It has demonstrated high internal consistency (α=.93 in college students, α=.92 
among outpatients) (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), and significant association with the original 
BDI (r=.93, p<.01) (Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998). Beck, Steer, and Brown (1996) also 
demonstrated high test-retest reliability (r=.93)., and convergent validity with the Hamilton 
Depression Rating Scale (r=.71) in a clinical population.  
 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger, Luschene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The 
STAI is intended to capture both fleeting, momentary anxiety and a general tendency toward 
anxiety. It includes 20 items focusing on how individuals feel in the current moment, as well as 
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20 items regarding how they generally feel. For both subscales, participants rate how they are 
feeling on a four point Likert scale, ranging from “not at all” to “very much so” for the state 
items and “almost never” to “almost always” for the trait items. Internal consistency ranged from 
.83 to .92 for high school and college students on the state score; for the trait score, internal 
consistency ranged from .86 to .92 (Spielberger, Luschene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The test-
retest coefficients were high for the trait scale (.84 for men, .76 for women), and low for the state 
scale (.33 for men, .16 for women), for which relatively low test-retest reliability would be 
expected (Spielberger, Luschene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983).  In an analysis of the reliability of the 
STAI across studies utilizing the instrument, Barnes, Harp, and Jung (2002) reported an average 
internal consistency for the state scale of .91, and an average test-retest reliability of .70. For the 
trait scale, the average internal consistency score was .89, and the average test-retest reliability 
was .88. 
 
Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (MOCI) (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977). Hodgson 
and Rachman (1977) developed the MOCI as a means of quantifying types of obsessional 
behavior.  The 30-item true-false scale represents four components: checking, cleaning, 
slowness, and doubting. The internal consistency of these scales, respectively, are 0.7, 0.8, 0.7, 
and 0.7; one-month test-retest reliability was high (Kendall’s tau = 0.8) in a sample of patients 
with OCD and a matched control group (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977). Sternberger and Burns 
(1990) examined the psychometric properties of the MOCI in a sample of college students; this 
was the first study to establish nonclinical norms for the MOCI. They found adequate internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability (α=.75; r=.69, p<.001). They also demonstrated convergent 
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validity with the Obsessive-Compulsive Scale of the Symptoms Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-
R) (r=.51). 
 
Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (FMPS) (Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 
1990). Frost, Marten, Lahart, and Rosenblate (1990) developed the FMPS as a means of 
measuring multiple dimensions conceptually relevant to perfectionism. At that time, several 
scales measuring perfectionism existed, but none accessed the complex nature of the construct. 
This 35-item scale yields 6 factors, accounting for 54% of the variance in the original sample of 
undergraduate females used for scale development (Frost et al., 1990). The factors include: 
Concern over Mistakes, Personal Standards, Parental Expectations, Parental Criticism, Doubts 
about Actions, and Organization. Internal consistencies for the subscales range from .77 to .93, 
and Cronbach’s alpha for the total scale was .90 (Frost et al., 1990). They also established 
convergent validity among subscales of the FMPS and several other perfectionism measures. The 
Burns Perfectionism Scale was highly correlated with the Concerns Over Mistakes subscale 
(r=.87) and moderately correlated with the Personal Standards (r=.53), Parental Expectations 
(r=.43), Parental Criticism (r=.42), and Doubts About Actions (r=.47) subscales (Frost et al., 
1990). The Perfectionism Scale from the Eating Disorder Inventory was also moderately 
correlated with the Concerns Over Mistakes (r=.57), Personal Standards (r=.44), Parental 
Expectations (r=.36), and Doubts About Actions (r=.34) subscales (Frost et al., 1990). 
 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) (Gross & John, 2003). The ERQ was intended to 
evaluate two emotion regulation strategies: cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. 
Gross and John (2003) conceptualize cognitive reappraisal as “a form of cognitive change that 
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involves construing a potentially emotion-eliciting situation in a way that changes its emotional 
impact” (p. 349). Expressive suppression, then, is the active inhibition of emotion-expressing 
behavior. The final scale includes 10 items, and responses are given on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”  The reappraisal and suppression factors 
were supported in factor analysis, and test-retest reliability across 3 months was .69 for both 
scales in a sample of undergraduate students (Gross & John, 2003). In a second study using the 
same sample of undergraduate students, Gross and John (2003) establish convergent validity 
between reappraisal and a scale measuring coping through reinterpretation (β=.43). 
 
Rigid vs. Flexible Dieting Scale (Westenhoefer, Stunkard, & Pudel, 1999). These scales were 
derived from the Cognitive Restraint scale of the Eating Inventory, and include 16 items 
measuring rigid control of eating (RC-16) and 12 items measuring flexible control of eating (FC-
12). Westenhoefer, Stunkard, and Pudel (1999) established internal consistency of 0.70 to 0.77 
for the Rigid Control subscale, and 0.69 to 0.79 for the Flexible Control scale in a random 
sample of subjects living in private households. Timko and Perone (2005) established convergent 
validity between the rigid control scale and several measures of eating disorder behavior, as well 
as a cognitive restraint scale in a sample of undergraduate men and women. 
 
Systemizing Quotient (SQ) (Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 
2003). The SQ was developed in response to the need for a self-report measure that captures 
systemizing, or the understanding of rules and how systems are organized (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2003); Ling, Burton, Salt, and Muncer (2009) assessed the psychometric properties of this scale 
in a sample of undergraduate students from several universities. They reported a Cronbach’s 
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alpha of .80, and determined that SQ loads onto four factors: topography (map reading), 
technicity (an interest in technical information), DIY, and structure (an interest in the structure of 
things). Nettle (2007) established convergent validity between the SQ and interest in fields that 
require particular attention to rules and systems, such as technology, computers, and science. 
 
Eating Attitudes Test-26 (EAT-26) (Garner, Olmsted, Bohr, & Garfinkel, 1982). The EAT-40 
was originally designed as a self-report measure of the symptoms of anorexia nervosa, and has 
been shown to be useful in identifying undiagnosed cases of anorexia nervosa, as well as groups 
of people with significant eating and weight concerns. The EAT-26 is a shortened version based 
on a factor analysis (Garner, Olmsted, Bohr & Garfinkel, 1982). Garner, Olmsted, Bohr, and 
Garfinkel’s (1982) sample of women with AN and control patients yielded three factors from the 
EAT-40: dieting, bulimia and food preoccupation, oral control. Fourteen items did not load onto 
any factor and were eliminated. The authors also established convergent validity with body-
image variables. Garner and Garfinkel (1979) reported high internal consistency for the EAT-40 
(α=0.94) in patients with AN and control patients. Garfinkel and Newman (2007) reviewed the 
literature and found that the EAT had high test-retest reliability, and converged with other 
measures of eating disorder symptomatology.  
 
International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg et al., 2006).  The IPIP item pool was 
developed as a means of providing measures of personality within the public domain. The 
development of these scales began in 1996 at the eighth European Conference on Personality and 
the scales have continued to grow since that time. The IPIP scales are continually refined through 
collaborative mechanisms, with the hope that progress would occur more rapidly by pooling 
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international personality researchers together. Each of the scales was constructed by correlating 
the items with the original Five Factor inventory scales. The items were then rank-ordered based 
on the size of the correlations to determine which scale the item should belong to, thus ensuring 
that the items selected for each scale correlated most highly with that scale. Further description 
of scale development is found in Goldberg et al. (2006). The items include short phrases (i.e., “I 
am quiet around strangers”) and respondents are asked to judge how applicable these statements 
are to themselves. The authors’ intention was to provide enough context within the short phrase 
such that different interpretations of the statements were limited. The items and scales chosen for 
this survey are proxies for the Big Five Factors: Emotional Stability, Extraversion, Intellect, 
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness; each factor has a 10-item scale. Responses are based on a 
5-point system ranging from very inaccurate to very accurate; responses are given a numerical 
assignment and then summed. Notably, the IPIP scales do not provide norms; this is a purposeful 
decision from one of the key authors. Examinations of the IPIP 50-item inventory have generally 
supported the five-factor structure for use in healthy young adult samples (Ehrhart, Roesch, 
Ehrhart, & Kilian, 2008; Guenole & Chernyshenko, 2005).  
 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task-64-Computerized Version (WCST-64-CV). (Heaton, 1993). 
The WCST-64-CV is a computerized and shortened version of the original WCST 128-card 
version. Because it maintains the basic requirements of the 128-card task, much of the literature 
focusing on the original task applies to the shortened version (Heaton, 1993). The task consists 
of four stimulus cards and 64 response cards. The stimulus cards display one red triangle, two 
green stars, three yellow crosses, and four blue circles; thus, there are three sorting parameters: 
color, shape, and number. Each response card displays varying shapes, colors, and numbers of 
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figures, and can be matched to the stimulus cards based on the three parameters. The participant 
must determine which sorting rule the computer is using based on feedback provided after each 
sort; the computer flashes either the word “Incorrect” or “Correct.” Based on this feedback, the 
participant must determine the computer’s sorting rule. After the participant has made 10 
consecutive correct matches, the computer changes the sorting rule without any indication to the 
participant. The participant must then discontinue the previous sorting rule and determine the 
new one. The participant is not told in the instructions that the sorting rule will change, but this 
should be deciphered based on the feedback provided during the task. This procedure continues 
for all 64 response cards. Possible outcome scores include the number of categories completed, 
the number of errors, the number of perseverations, the number of trials needed to complete the 
first category, consistency in maintaining a response set, and learning efficiency. This study used 
the following outcomes: number of categories completed, number of perseverations, and number 
of trials needed to complete the first category. These outcome measures specifically targeted 
perseveration and ability to learn new rules. 
 The WCST was developed as a measure of flexible thinking and abstract reasoning 
ability in normal adults (Heaton, 1993). Research originally suggested that the WCST is 
particularly sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction (Heaton, 1993). Recent studies have indicated 
that it involves diffuse brain areas (Lie, Specht, Marshall, & Fink, 2006), which is unsurprising 
in view of our current understanding of the interconnected nature of brain circuitry. Lie, Specht, 
Marshall, and Fink (2006)’s analysis of the neural circuitry involved in the task indicated that 
brain areas associated with working memory were also activated in a sample of healthy 
volunteers. Given that participants are asked to hold the previous sorting rule while sorting the 
current card, the involvement of working memory would be expected. Despite the involvement 
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of other neural processes, the WCST does activate set-shifting circuitry and remains a task 
frequently used to operationalize this ability (Lie, Specht, Marshall, & Fink, 2006). Test-retest 
reliability of 0.64 was reported by Ingram, Greve, Ingram, and Soukup (1999) in their sample of 
sleep apnea patients. Although previous test-retest reliabilities have been lower, this might be 
expected due to the nature of the test. Once an individual has completed the WCST, he or she is 
aware that the rule will change during the task. This likely changes the nature of what is being 
measured. 
 
Trail Making Test, Part B. (TMT-B) (Reitan, 1958). The Trail Making Test consists of two 
components: Part A (TMT-A) and Part B (TMT-B). The task for TMT-A requires participants to 
draw a line connecting numbers in order (i.e., 1-2-3, etc.); the numbers are jumbled throughout 
the page. The primary outcome measure is time to completion. TMT-A measures several 
cognitive processes, including working memory, motor skills, and a visual perceptual ability. 
TMT-B includes numbers and letters scattered throughout a page. Participants are asked to draw 
a line alternating between numbers and letters in sequential order (i.e., 1-A-2-B-3-C, etc). The 
primary outcome is the time to completion for this task compared to the time to complete part A. 
The primary difference between parts A and B is that part B requires cognitive flexibility; thus, 
comparing the time for part B to part A gives an estimate of set-shifting ability (Kortte, Horner, 
& Windham, 2002). This test specifically captured the ability to alternate flexibly and quickly 
between mental sets. 
 Several studies have established the validity of the TMT-B as a measure of cognitive 
flexibility. In a sample of veterans referred for neuropsychological evaluation, Kortte, Horner, 
and Windham (2002) conducted an analysis to establish that, aside from time on Part A, the 
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variable that accounts for the most variance in Part B was a measure of cognitive flexibility (R2 
change= 0.07, p<.001).  In their comparison of the TMT-B to a classic set-switching task, 
Arbuthnott and Frank (2002) found that, in a sample of undergraduate students, the TMT-B was 
highly correlated with switch-cost in their set-switching tasks. The scores on the set-shifting task 
were particularly correlated with the B/A ratio. Similarly, Sanchez-Cubillo et al. (2009)’s 
analysis of the TMT in healthy patients found that the B/A ratio minimized the influence of 
visuoperceptual and working memory demands and provided a purer index of executive control. 
As is true of many neuropsychological tasks, the TMT is susceptible to practice effects. 
However, at longer time intervals, test-retest reliability does not appear to be as impacted by 
these effects (Bowie & Harvey, 2006).  
 
Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). The Brixton Spatial Anticipation 
Test measures the ability of participants to detect and follow a rule, and then to detect and follow 
a new rule. It has no time restriction, and takes approximately 10 minutes to administer (van den 
Berg et al., 2009). Participants are presented with a 56-page stimulus booklet; each page of the 
booklet contains an array of 10 circles numbered 1 to 10. On each page, one circle is blue, and 
the position of the blue circle changes on subsequent pages. These changes follow a specific rule, 
and the rule changes periodically without warning. Participants are asked to predict the 
movement of the blue circle. The total number of errors across all trials is used as the outcome 
measure (maximum score=55) (van den Berg et al., 2009). This was included in the current study 
as a second measure of perseveration and ability to learn rules. In van den Berg et al.’s (2009) 
analysis of the Brixton task as a measure of executive function, it was determined that the test 
was able to discriminate between patients with executive dysfunction (group consisting of 
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patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, stroke, and psychiatric disorders) and those without 
cognitive dysfunction (healthy controls and patients with diabetes mellitus). Additionally, the 
test was further able to differentiate between patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, which is 
generally considered to produce significant impairment, and those with stroke and psychiatric 
disorders. The authors interpret this as indicative of the Brixton test’s sensitivity to subtle 
impairments. Further, their analysis indicated that the test loaded with the TMT-B in their 
neuropsychological battery; this was taken to mean that the two tasks composed a mental 
flexibility factor. Test-retest correlation was reported by Burgess and Shallice (1997) (r=0.71), 
and van den Berg et al. (2009) (r=0.61). Although not as high as might be preferable, many 
neuropsychological tasks have marked learning effects that impact test-retest correlations. 
Statistical Analyses 
 Pearson correlation coefficients were used to examine the relationship between each set-
shifting outcome (WCST: number of categories completed, number of perseverations, and 
number of trials needed to complete the first category; Brixton: total number of errors; TMT: 
B/A completion time ratio) and depression, anxiety, obsessionality, perfectionism, dietary 
restraint, emotion regulation, and systematizing. Based on previous literature, correlations 
between set-shifting and depression, obsessionality, perfectionism, and emotion regulation were 
expected to be small (r= 0.2). In order to achieve 80% power for a two-tailed test, G*Power 3.1 
indicated that a total sample size of 193 participants would be needed. Due to the deficit in prior 
research on the relationship between set-shifting and dietary restraint, as well as set-shifting and 
systematizing, this analysis was purely exploratory. Pearson correlation coefficients were also 
used to examine the relationship between the neuropsychological tasks and the self-report 
measure of cognitive flexibility. 
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 A MANOVA was used to detect any gender differences in set-shifting ability; with each 
set-shifting outcome included as a dependent variable. With a two-tailed test for a medium effect 
size, 64 participants were needed in each group to detect group differences. If significant, it was 
planned that linear regression would be used to determine the contribution of each independent 
variable to variance in set-shifting ability, and to determine whether gender moderated the 
relationship between set-shifting and depression, anxiety, obsessionality, perfectionism, dietary 
restraint, emotion regulation, and systematizing.  The regression analyses would be run 
separately for each variable using Process for SPSS v2.13. Given the exploratory nature of this 
analysis, power analyses were based on a medium effect size (f2=0.15). To achieve 80% power 
to detect gender differences, the total sample size required would be 68 participants. Given the 
higher number of participants required to detect the predicted small correlations, the recruitment 
for this study was 194 participants total. Although it would be ideal to have included an equal 
number of men and women, it was not possible to recruit 97 men. We allowed for a greater 
number of female participants, with a minimum of 64 male participants. 
Specific Hypotheses: 
1. WCST number of perseverations, number of trials needed to complete the first category, 
and Brixton number of errors were expected to be positively correlated with the BDI-2, 
HADS-depression, MOCI, RC-16, the SQ, and Emotional Stability from the IPIP. They 
were also expected to be positively correlated with the Parental Expectations, Doubts 
over Actions, Concern over Mistakes, and Parental Criticism of the FMPS. It was 
hypothesized that they would be negatively correlated with Personal Standards and 
Organization scales from the FMPS, the FC-12, the ERQ—cognitive reappraisal score, 
and Intellect from the IPIP. They were not expected to be significantly correlated with the 
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HADS-anxiety, the STAI, the CFI, or the Agreeableness, Extraversion, or 
Conscientiousness scales of the IPIP.  
2. TMT-B was expected to have similar relationships as above to anxiety, depression, 
obsessionality, dietary restraint, systemizing, perfectionism, and self-reported cognitive 
flexibility, and the Big Five personality factors. However, it was expected that the TMT-
B will have a negative relationship with ERQ—cognitive reappraisal scale. 
3. WCST total number of categories achieved was hypothesized to be positively correlated 
with the Personal Standards and Organization scales from the FMPS, the FC-12, the 
ERQ—cognitive reappraisal scale, and Intellect from the IPIP. It was hypothesized to be 
negatively related to the BDI-2, HADS-depression, MOCI, RC-16, the SQ, and 
Emotional Stability from the IPIP. It was also expected to be negatively correlated with 
the Parental Expectations, Doubts over Actions, Concern over Mistakes, and Parental 
Criticism scales of the FMPS. It was not expected to be significantly correlated with the 
HADS-anxiety, the STAI, the CFI, or the Agreeableness, Extraversion, or 
Conscientiousness scales of the IPIP. 
4. As previously indicated, the analyses regarding the impact of gender on these 
relationships was purely exploratory. As such, no specific hypotheses were made. 
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Results 
Missing data. Participants were recruited through the undergraduate psychology program at the 
University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa.  Students enrolled in psychology courses were offered class 
credit or extra credit for participation in research studies during the semester.  In total, 257 
students completed the online surveys.  All were contacted to schedule the in-person assessment 
and 195 (75.9%) followed the study through to completion.  When comparing study completers 
to non-completers using independent sample t-tests, non-completers scored significantly higher 
on the HADS depression scale (t(255) = 2.61, p= .01) and significantly lower on the ERQ 
Reappraisal scale (t(255) = -2.79, p= .006).  Non-completers also scored significantly lower on 
the IPIP Agreeableness (t(255) = -3.75, p<.001), IPIP Conscientiousness (t(255) = -2.67, p= 
.008), and IPIP Intellect scales (t(255) = -3.37, p= .001).  It is reasonable to hypothesize that 
increased depressive symptomatology and lower agreeableness, conscientiousness, and curiosity 
would impact students’ willingness to spend additional time participating in research.  Group 
differences on emotional reappraisal are more difficult to interpret, but may be a byproduct of the 
negative association between the HADS Depression and the ERQ Reappraisal scores (r = -.25, 
p< .001), such that increases in depressive symptomatology are related to decreases in emotional 
reappraisal and account for group differences on this variable.  
 A portion of participants who completed the in-person assessment failed to answer every 
item, resulting in some missing data points (<1% of all data points).  When considered 
appropriate based on literature review, alternative scoring methods were utilized so as to include 
as much data as possible.  One individual had 1 missing data point for the BDI.  This individual 
was included in analyses with the score adjusted for the missing data (sum divided by the 
number of completed items, multiplied by 21) (Dolle et al., 2012).  Five individuals had 1 
missing data point on the EAT-26 and the median of the scale was imputed into these missing 
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data points (Garner, Olmstead, Bohr, & Garfinkel, 1982).  Three participants had 1 missing data 
point on the IPIP and this was resolved through imputation of the median value (Goldberg et al., 
2006).  Only complete questionnaires were used for the STAI, MOCI, FMPS, ERQ, FC-12, RC-
16, and SQ.  This resulted in 0.01% to 2.5% missing data across scales.  Additionally, the 
computer utilized to administer the WCST malfunctioned on two separate occasions, resulting in 
incomplete assessment for two participants.  These participants’ other neuropsychological 
measures were included in final analyses. 
 All self-report measures, with the exception of the EAT (skewness = 2.05, kurtosis = 
4.91), were within standard bounds of normality (skewness < 1.00, kurtosis < 2.00).  Several of 
the neuropsychological measures were heavily kurtotic, as seen in Table 1.  After removing 4 
univariate outliers, the variables were closer to normal (see Table 1).  Although the WCST “trials 
to complete the 1st category” remained kurtotic, this variable was included in final analyses 
because general linear models are considered fairly robust to violations of normality when the 
sample size is large (Warner, 2013).  This resulted in a final data set with 191 participants (71 
males, 120 females).  Additionally, a log transformation was used for the outcome variable on 
the TMT (i.e., ratio of time to complete part B to time to complete part A).  This transformation 
brought the measure within normal ranges on skewness and kurtosis.  All subsequent analyses 
were run with both the original data and the transformed data, with only minor differences in the 
size of correlations.  Accordingly, the non-transformed results are reported for ease of 
interpretation. 
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Table 1. Normality data for variables that exceeded suggested guidelines for skewness and 
kurtosis. 
 With outliers Without outliers 
 Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis 
WCST Trials 
to 1st 
6.45 51.48 3.84 16.87 
WCST Cat. 
Comp. 
-1.78 4.27 -1.58 3.61 
WCST Pers. 
Err. 
3.56 21.79 1.34 1.77 
TMT B : A 1.42 3.00 0.27 -0.03 
WCST, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Cat. Comp., Categories Complete; Pers. Err., Perseverative Errors; TMT B : A, Trail Making Test ratio of 
time B : time A 
 
Bivariate Correlations 
 Bivariate correlations between self-report measures and measures of set-shifting are 
reported in Table 2 (see Appendix A).  Poorer set-shifting is thought to be reflected in a greater 
number of trials needed to complete the first WCST category, fewer WCST categories 
completed, and a larger number of perseverative errors on the WCST and the Brixton task.  
Greater difficulty set-shifting is also represented by a larger TMT ratio of time to complete part 
B to time to complete part A, as this would be indicative of a larger discrepancy between the 
time needed to complete parts A and B.  Further, lower CFI Alternatives and Control scores (i.e., 
less self-perceived ability to consider multiple solutions or explanations and decreased ability to 
see difficult situations as controllable) are thought to indicate lesser cognitive flexibility. 
Full Sample 
Anxiety and set-shifting had an overall negative association, as the HADS-A had small 
but significant correlations indicating that anxiety was associated with a larger number of trials 
needed to complete the first WCST category (r = .15, p= .04) and fewer WCST categories 
completed (r = -.17, p= .02).  Rigid dieting strategies, measured by the RC-16, were similarly 
negatively linked with set-shifting, as increases in rigid dieting were associated with fewer 
categories completed (r = -.16, p= .03) and more perseverative errors (r = .17, p= .02). Parental 
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expectations and organizational standards were also negatively related to set-shifting, as 
increases in the FMPS Parental Expectations and Organization subscales were linked with a 
larger number of perseverative errors on the WCST (Parental Expectations: r = .18, p=.01; 
Organization: r = .17, p=.02). Further, eating pathology on the EAT-26 was negatively 
associated with set-shifting, as increases in eating concerns correlated with fewer categories 
completed (r = -.18, p= .01).  There were no significant associations among the number of errors 
on the Brixton task and the independent variables, nor among the TMT B : A ratio and the 
independent variables. 
The self-report measures of cognitive flexibility showed stronger correlations with the 
independent variables.  Consistent with the neuropsychological measures, anxiety was negatively 
associated with self-perceived ability to consider multiple solutions or explanations, as measured 
by the CFI Alternatives subscale (HADS Anxiety: r = -.26, p< .001; STAI X1: r = -.30, p<.001; 
STAI X2: r = -.33, p<.001).  The CFI Alternatives subscale was also positively correlated with 
the use of emotional reappraisal strategies (ERQ Reappraisal: r = .24, p=.001), tendencies 
towards systemizing (SQ: r = .40, p<.001), and personal standards (FMPS Personal Standards: r 
= .30, p<.001). It was negatively related to depression (HADS Depression: r = -.30, p<.001; 
BDI: r = -.29, p<.001) and self-doubt (FMPS Doubts about Actions: r = -.19, p = .009), 
highlighting the importance of conceptualizing and measuring perfectionism as a 
multidimensional construct.  Additionally, the CFI Alternatives subscale was positively linked to 
each dimension of personality (IPIP Extraversion: r = .39, p<.001; Agreeableness: r = .39, 
p<.001; Conscientiousness: r = .21, p = .003; Emotional Stability: r = .27, p<.001; and Intellect: 
r = .50, p<.001).  This indicates that participants with poorer self-perceived ability to consider 
multiple solutions were less likely to enjoy the stimulation of large crowds, more skeptical, less 
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efficient or organized, more emotionally labile, and had fewer tendencies towards an intellectual 
or imaginative style.  
A consistent pattern was seen with the CFI Alternatives subscale and the CFI Control 
subscale (see Table 2), such that the relations between the Control subscale and the independent 
variables were in the same direction as those between the Alternatives subscale and the 
independent variables.  Decreased ability to see situations as controllable (i.e., poorer cognitive 
flexibility) was negatively associated with anxiety (HADS Anxiety: r = -.48, p<.001; STAI X1: r 
= -.47, p<.001; STAI X2: r = -.56, p<.001), depression (HADS Depression: r = -.40, p<.001; 
BDI: r = -.46, p<.001), and self-doubt (FMPS Doubts about Actions: r = -.41, p<.001).  This 
subscale was also positively related use of emotion reappraisal strategies (ERQ Reappraisal: r = 
.25, p =.001), systemizing (SQ: r = .40, p<.001), and personal standards (FMPS Personal 
Standards: r= .25, p<.001).  Perceived level of control was positively correlated with each 
domain of personality measured (IPIP Extraversion: r= .43, p<.001; Agreeableness: r=.22, 
p=.002; Conscientiousness: r=.28, p<.001; Emotional Stability: r=.46, p<.001; Intellect: r=.37, 
p<.001).  Patterns unique to the CFI Control subscale included its negative relation with the 
MOCI (r = -.28, p<.001), FMPS Concerns about Mistakes (r = -.30, p<.001), FMPS Parental 
Criticisms (r = -.16, p = .03), and ERQ Suppression (r = -.17, p<.02), indicating that less 
perceived controllability is linked to an increase in obsessiveness, concerns about mistakes, 
levels of parental criticism, and emotional suppression. 
As indicated in Table 3, the neuropsychological measures showed little to no association 
with the self-report measure of set-shifting, with all correlations being less than .01.  The 
Brixton, WCST, and TMT further evidenced little relation between each other, with the only 
significant correlations found between different measures from the WCST.  The WCST number 
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of categories completed was negatively related to the trials to 1st category (r = -.28, p<.001), 
such that increases in the number of trials needed to complete the 1st category were associated 
with fewer categories completed overall. Additionally, the number of perseverative errors on the 
WCST was negatively correlated with the number of categories completed (r = -.40, p<.001), 
indicating that increases in perseveration were linked with fewer completed categories. 
 
Table 3. Bivariate correlations among measures of set-shifting. 
 
 CFI Alt CFI 
Con 
Brixton WCST 
Trials to 
1st 
WCST 
C. 
Comp. 
WCST 
Pers. 
Errors 
TMT 
B : A 
CFI Alt. 1 .63** -.04 .02 .05 .01 .05 
CFI Con.  1 -.03 -.03 .12 -.02 .10 
Brixton   1 .05 -.06 .11 .13 
WCST 
Trials 1st 
   1 -.28** .02 .003 
WCST 
C. Com. 
    1 -.40** -.06 
WCST 
Pers. Err 
     1 .04 
TMT 
B : A 
      1 
* p<.05 
**p<.01 
CFI Alt, Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Alternatives; CFI Con., Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Control; Brixton, Brixton total errors; 
WCST, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; C. Comp., Categories Completed; Pers. Err., Perseverative Errors; IPIP; TMT B : A, Trail Making Test 
ratio of time B : time A 
 
 The four items added to the CFI Alternatives subscale were significantly positively 
correlated with the original CFI Alternatives scale (r = .96, p<.001).  They also showed a similar 
pattern and strength of associations between the independent variables as was seen with the 
original CFI Alternatives scale.  Therefore, it seems unlikely that the additional items added 
unique information about self-perceived cognitive flexibility. 
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High eating pathology  
Participants with a total EAT-26 score greater than 19 represent a group with potentially 
significant eating and weight/shape concerns (Garner, Olmstead, Bohr, & Garfinkel, 1982).  
Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations for this group (n = 27) and individuals with 
EAT-26 scores less than 19 (n = 164) on the measures of set shifting. The largest differences, 
while considering variance, appeared to exist on the Brixton task and the number of categories 
completed on the WCST. As a result, a MANOVA was utilized to determine that at least one of 
these differences, or the combination of the two, reached statistical significance (Box’s M = .84, 
p=.85; Wilks Λ = .96, F(1, 187), p=.01) such that participants with elevated eating disorder 
symptomatology performed significantly worse. Other scales were not included in this 
MANOVA because of the seemingly small differences between the groups and the 
underpowered nature of this analysis. 
Table 4. Means and standard deviations on measures of set-shifting for the full sample and 
participants with EAT-26 scores greater than 19. 
 
 EAT-26 < 19 EAT-26  > 19 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
CFI Alt. 69.41 8.52 69.56 6.32 
CFI Con. 35.70 7.23 33.85 6.04 
Brixton 12.02 3.79 13.48 3.32 
WCST 
Trials 1st 
11.94 3.21 12.08 2.74 
WCST 
C. Com. 
4.42 0.78 4.04 .82 
WCST 
Pers. Err 
5.05 1.49 5.27 1.51 
TMT 
B : A 
2.64 1.03 2.71 0.98 
EAT-26, Eating Attitudes Test 26-item version; CFI Alt, Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Alternatives; CFI Con., Cognitive Flexibility 
Inventory – Control; Brixton, Brixton total errors; WCST, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; C. Comp., Categories Completed; Pers. Err., 
Perseverative Errors; IPIP; TMT B : A, Trail Making Test ratio of time B : time A 
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This group was subsequently analyzed separately to determine whether a distinct pattern 
emerged for participants with higher levels of eating disorder symptomatology (see Table 5, 
Appendix A).  Although fewer statistically significant results were found, this may be due to the 
small sample size.  Despite statistical non-significance, many of the correlations were moderate 
to large in size. 
The neuropsychological measures appeared to have stronger associations with several 
variables in this group.  In this subset of participants, the Brixton task was positively associated 
with anxiety (HADS Anxiety: r = .31, p = .12), depression (HADS Depression: r = .19, p = .25), 
obsessionality (MOCI: r = .17, p = .40), organizational standards (FMPS Organization: r = .31, p 
= .12), systemizing (SQ: r = .18, p = .16), and conscientiousness (IPIP Conscientiousness: r = 
.27, p = .17), indicating that increases in each of these variables was related to a greater number 
of errors on the Brixton task.  The Brixton task was also negatively correlated to parental 
expectations, (FMPS Parental Expectations: r = -.28, p = .15), rigid dieting (RC-16: r = -.29, p = 
.15), and agreeableness (IPIP Agreeableness: r = -.29, p = .14), such that an increase in errors 
was related to a decrease in each of these variables. 
The TMT was significantly negatively correlated with flexible dieting (FC-12: r = -.60, 
p<.001), such that worse set-shifting (i.e., larger TMT score) was linked with decreased use of 
flexible dieting strategies.  Set-shifting on the TMT also had moderate to large but statistically 
non-significant negative associations with the HADS Anxiety (r = -.22, p = .26), FMPS Parental 
Criticisms (r = -.32, p = .10), RC-16 (r = -.35, p = .08), and IPIP Intellect (r = -.23, p = .25). It 
had non-significant positive relations with the HADS Depression (r = .20, p = .31) and the SQ (r 
= .26, p = .21). Thus, individuals with a larger TMT ratio (i.e., worse set-shifting) had decreased 
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levels of anxiety, parental criticism, rigid dieting practices, and a less imaginative approach, 
while they had increased levels of depression and systemizing.  
The WCST perseverative error score was significantly positively associated with the 
FMPS Concerns about Mistakes subscale (r = .41, p = .04), such that larger number of errors 
were associated with a greater concern about mistakes.  The perseverative error score also had 
moderate to large but statistically non-significant positive correlations with HADS Depression (r 
= .24, p = .25), FMPS Doubts about Actions (r = .29, p = .15), FMPS Parental Expectations (r = 
.23, p = .26), FMPS Parental Criticisms (r = .29, p = .15), FMPS Personal Standards (r = .23, p = 
.26), and FMPS Organization (r = .27, p = .18), while it had a negative relation with IPIP 
Agreeableness (r = -.33, p = .10).  Individuals with a greater number of perseverative errors on 
the WCST tended to have higher levels of depression, doubts about their actions, parental 
expectations, parental criticism, personal standards, organization, and skepticism.  The number 
of trials to complete the first category in the WCST was significantly negatively associated with 
the ERQ Reappraisal (r = -.51, p= .009) and the IPIP Emotional Stability subscale (r = -.40, p = 
.04), indicating that increases in the number of trials needed to learn the first rule were associated 
with decreased use of reappraisal strategies and less emotional stability. The number of trials to 
achieve the first category also exhibited moderate to large non-significant positive relations with 
HADS Depression (r = .26, p = .19), BDI (r = .29, p = .16), STAI X1 (r =.20, p = .32), STAI X2 
(r =  .23, p = .27), FMPS Concerns about Mistakes (r = .26, p = .21), FMPS Parental Criticisms 
(r = .37, p = .06), with negative correlations with the ERQ Suppression (r = -.34, p = .09) and SQ 
(r = -.23, p = .28).  This indicates that an increased number of trials needed to achieve the first 
category (i.e., less efficient set-shifting) is linked with increased depression, anxiety, concern 
over mistakes, and parental criticisms, and with decreased emotional suppression and 
	60	
systemizing.  Finally, the number of categories completed on the WCST was not significantly 
correlated with any other measure in this group, but displayed small to moderate positive 
associations with FMPS Parental Criticisms (r = .21, p = .31), ERQ Suppression (r = .22, p = 
.29), RC-16 (r = .18, p = .39), and IPIP Intellect (r = .21, p = .30), such that decreases in the 
number of categories completed (i.e., worse set-shifting) were associated with fewer perceptions 
of parental criticism  and less emotional suppression, rigid dieting, and imaginative approaches. 
The strength of the correlations between the CFI and most of the self-report measures 
was reduced in this sample.  Self-perceived ability to see multiple solutions remained 
significantly positively associated with personal standards (FMPS Personal Standards: r = .44, 
p=.02) and intellectual tendencies (IPIP Intellect: r = .56, p=.002).  Although not statistically 
significant, it also had moderate to large negative relations to depression (BDI: r = -.25, p = .21) 
and anxiety (STAI X1: r = -.21, p = .29; STAI X2: r = -.33, p = .10). The CFI Alternatives had 
statistically non-significant positive correlations with concern over mistakes (FMPS Concerns 
about Mistakes: r = .26, p = .20), parental expectations (FMPS Parental Expectations: r = .26, p 
= .18), concern with organization (FMPS Organization: r = .35, p = .07), and systemizing (SQ: r 
= .29, p = .15).  Ability to see multiple explanations was also positively linked with extraverted 
tendencies and conscientiousness (IPIP Extraversion: r = .32, p = .10; IPIP Conscientiousness: r 
= .26, p = .18).  Ability to see situations as controllable showed a significant positive association 
with systemizing (SQ: r = .25, p=.02), but had non-significant positive correlations with concern 
with personal standards (FMPS Personal Standards: r = .20, p = .32), conscientiousness (IPIP 
Conscientiousness: r = .38, p = .05), and imaginative tendencies (IPIP Intellect: r = .26, p = .20).  
As seen in Table 6, the correlations among the neuropsychological measures of set-
shifting and the self-report measures of cognitive flexibility remained limited, such that increases 
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in ability to see multiple solutions (i.e., CFI Alternatives) was associated with increases in 
perception of controllability (i.e., CFI Control) (r = .35, p = .073) and increases in perceived 
controllability were linked with increases in the number of categories completed on the WCST (r 
= .34, p=.09).  Additionally, a larger number of trials needed to complete the first category on the 
WCST was negatively associated with the TMT B : A (r = -.33, p = .11).  
Table 6. Bivariate correlations among measures of set-shifting for participants with EAT scores 
greater than 19. 
 
 CFI Alt CFI 
Con 
Brixton WCST 
Trials to 
1st 
WCST 
C. 
Comp. 
WCST 
Pers. 
Errors 
TMT 
B : A 
CFI Alt. 1 .35 -.07 .18 .14 .06 -.16 
CFI Con.  1 -.06 .01 .34 -.09 .04 
Brixton   1 .02 .04 .18 -.08 
WCST 
Trials 1st 
   1 -.06 .15 -.33 
WCST 
C. Com. 
    1 -.30 .10 
WCST 
Pers. Err 
     1 -.07 
TMT 
B : A 
      1 
* p<.05 
**p<.01 
EAT, Eating Attitudes Test; CFI Alt, Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Alternatives; CFI Con., Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Control; 
Brixton, Brixton total errors; WCST, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; C. Comp., Categories Completed; Pers. Err., Perseverative Errors; IPIP; TMT 
B : A, Trail Making Test ratio of time B : time A 
 
The bivariate correlations were also analyzed for the participants with lower eating 
disorder symptomatology (EAT-26 < 19).  No correlations between the measures of set-shifting 
and the independent variables differed by more than .08 from the full sample analyses.  Though 
several correlations changed significance level, the actual changes in strength of the relations 
were small.  
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Table 7 (see Appendix A) displays the associations between high levels of each 
independent variable on self-report and neuropsychological measures of set-shifting separated by 
group (high eating symptomatology and the full sample).  The nature of the relations between 
several of the independent variables and self-reported cognitive flexibility appeared to differ 
based on group, such that high obsessionality and high concern over mistakes were related to 
better cognitive flexibility for participants with EAT-26 scores greater than 19, but worse 
cognitive flexibility for the full sample.  Additionally, self-doubt and parental criticism were 
related to self-reported cognitive flexibility in the full sample but not in the group with higher 
eating symptomatology.  Further, level of organization was correlated with self-reported 
cognitive flexibility only in the subset of patients with elevated eating pathology.  
As can be seen in Table 7, more neuropsychological tasks were related to the independent 
variables in the subset of patients with greater eating concerns.  Additionally, the nature of the 
association between set-shifting and rigid dieting differed between the groups such that higher 
tendencies toward rigid dieting were related to better set-shifting in the group with potential 
eating disorder symptomatology, but worse set-shifting in the full sample. 
Table 7 also clearly indicates that within the group with greater eating pathology, the 
nature of the relations between the independent variables and the neuropsychological tasks 
depended on the task used.  The neuropsychological tasks yielded mixed results for the 
associations between set-shifting and anxiety, such that higher anxiety was linked with worse 
set-shifting when measured by the Brixton task and the WCST, but better set-shifting when 
utilizing the TMT. A similar pattern was seen for the FMPS Parental Criticisms subscale.  High 
obsessionality was associated with worse set-shifting when measured using the number of errors 
made on both the Brixton and the WCST, but was associated with better set-shifting when 
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considering the number of categories achieved on the WCST.  Finally, greater perceived parental 
expectations were related to worse set-shifting when using the number of perseverative errors 
made on the WCST, but better set-shifting when considering the number of errors made on the 
Brixton task. 
Elevated depressive and anxiety symptomatology  
 Although not originally planned, participants with BDI scores greater than 20 (n = 45) 
and HADS Anxiety scores greater than 8 (n = 82) were analyzed separately to aid in avoiding 
interpretive mistakes in the group with elevated eating disorder symptomatology.  Table 8 
displays the means and standard deviations for these two groups. Importantly, there is a degree 
of participant overlap among these groups (e.g., individuals with both higher anxiety and 
depressive symptomatology) and this prevented outcomes from being compared across the three 
groups. However, visual inspection of the results highlight potential differences in the Brixton 
task, the number of WCST categories completed, and the TMT ratio of time B : A, such that 
individuals with greater eating pathology appeared to have a greater number of errors, fewer 
categories completed, and a greater discrepancy in the TMT ratio than those with depressive and 
anxiety symptomatology.  
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Table 8. Means and standard deviations on measures of set-shifting for the full sample and 
participants with BDI scores greater than 20 and HADS Anxiety scores greater than 8. 
 
 BDI > 20 HADS-A  > 8 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
CFI Alt. 66.71 8.43 67.56 8.16 
CFI Con. 30.82 7.20 32.45 6.63 
Brixton 12.16 3.36 12.46 3.61 
WCST 
Trials 1st 
11.93 3.31 12.19 3.57 
WCST 
C. Com. 
4.27 .92 4.22 .91 
WCST 
Pers. Err 
4.96 1.41 5.21 1.63 
TMT 
B : A 
2.23 1.07 2.64 1.09 
BDI-11, Beck Depression Inventory Version 2; HADS – A, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Inventory – Anxiety Scale; CFI Alt, Cognitive 
Flexibility Inventory – Alternatives; CFI Con., Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Control; Brixton, Brixton total errors; WCST, Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test; C. Comp., Categories Completed; Pers. Err., Perseverative Errors; IPIP; TMT B : A, Trail Making Test ratio of time B : time A 
 
Tables 9 and 10 indicate that the correlations between the independent variables and the 
measures of set shifting for the high depressive and high anxiety groups, respectively. 
Differences between the eating disorder symptomatology group and these two groups are seen, 
both in size and direction of associations, between the outcomes and depression, perfectionism, 
rigid dieting, systemizing, agreeableness, intellectual tendencies, and conscientiousness. For 
example, the group with elevated depressive symptomatology exhibited a positive and large 
correlation between the number of WCST trials needed to achieve the first category and HADS 
Anxiety (r = .46, p<.001), indicating that increases in anxiety were associated with a greater 
number of trials needed to learn the initial rule. The group with greater eating disorder 
symptomatology exhibited a minimal correlation between HADS Anxiety and the number of 
WCST “trials to 1st category.” Further, the association between FMPS Organization and the 
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number of errors on the Brixton task was large and positive in the group with higher eating 
symptomatology, but moderate and negative in the group with increased depressive 
symptomatology. In this sample, higher organizational standards were related to a greater 
tendency to err on the Brixton task for individuals with increased eating disorder 
symptomatology, but were associated with fewer mistakes in individuals with elevated 
depressive symptomatology. 
Gender Analyses 
 A one-way MANOVA was utilized to examine whether gender differences existed in the 
neuropsychological and self-report measures of set-shifting. Box’s M was interpreted as non-
significant (M = 28.41, p=.51), indicating that the covariance matrices are likely equal across 
dependent variables.  The current sample did not appear to show gender differences across 
measures of set-shifting (Wilks Λ = .94, F(7, 181), p=.112).  Analyses indicated that the sample 
had 68.5% power, however, leaving open the possibility that they were underpowered to detect a 
group difference.  
Linear Regression Analyses 
A simultaneous linear regression was utilized to determine the contribution of each 
independent variable to variance in set-shifting ability.  Given the low correlations between the 
neuropsychological variables and the independent variables, this analysis was performed only for 
the self-report measure of set-shifting.  Independent variables that had significant correlations 
with the CFI Alternatives subscale were entered into the model, but the BDI, STAI X1, and 
STAI X2 had potentially problematic multicollinearity (BDI: VIF= 5.71; STAI X1: VIF = 5.07; 
STAI X2: VIF = 7.55).  As a result, the regression was re-run without these three variables, with 
the variance inflation factors for the remaining variables ranging from 1.20 through 2.08.  As can 
be seen in Table 11 (see Appendix A), FMPS Personal Standards (B = .28, SE = .13, p = .03), 
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IPIP Agreeableness (B = .28, SE = .09, p = .003), and IPIP Intellect (B = .33, SE = .11, p = .004) 
were significant predictors of the CFI Alternatives subscale, with the IPIP Agreeableness and 
IPIP Intellect subscales accounting for the most variance in set-shifting (partial correlations = 
.22).  As agreeableness, personal standards, and imaginative capacity increase, self-perceived 
ability to see multiple solutions also increases, with the most significant impact from 
agreeableness and intellect.  The current model accounted for 39.9% of the variance in the CFI 
Alternatives scale.   
When examining the CFI Control subscale, multicollinearity again proved problematic 
for the BDI (VFI = 5.77), STAI X1 (VFI = 5.26), and the STAI X2 (VFI = 7.95).  These 
variables were removed from the regression analysis, with remaining variables’ variance 
inflation factors ranging from 1.30 through 2.61.  Table 12 (see Appendix A) displays the results 
from regressing the CFI Control subscale on those independent variables with which it had a 
significant bivariate correlation.  HADS Anxiety (B = -.37, SE = .16, p = .021), FMPS Personal 
Standards (B =  .24, SE = .11, p = .027), and SQ (B = .13, SE = .08, p=.006) were significant 
predictors, with systemizing accounting for the most variance (partial correlation = .21).  As 
anxiety decreases and personal standards and systemizing increase, self-perceived ability to see 
difficult situations as controllable increases.  Overall, the model accounted for 48.1% of the 
variance in the CFI Control scale. 
Factor Analyses 
 Although not part of the initial design, an exploratory factor analysis was utilized to 
investigate the number of constructs captured by the measures of set-shifting. The mixed nature 
of the associations among the neuropsychological variables and the independent variables might 
indicate that multiple constructs are being captured. Maximum likelihood extraction with direct 
oblimin rotation was utilized and the model failed to converge using 25 iterations. A principle 
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components analysis was subsequently utilized to determine the number of components that best 
reproduced the observed variability seen in the current dataset.  Although this type of analysis is 
less hypothesis-driven than an exploratory factor analysis, it allows the data to be reduced in 
scenarios with little previous research supporting a hypothesis-driven approach. However, the 
data were unable to be reduced to a good solution (KMO = .50), leaving it unclear how many 
constructs the current battery of neuropsychological tasks captured. 
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Discussion 
 Most striking about the pattern of results seen in the current study is their diversity, with 
some associations in a direction consistent with hypothesized relations between set-shifting and 
the independent variables, some showing a complex pattern apparently dependent upon degree of 
symptomatology, and several demonstrating a set of correlations opposite to the predicted model. 
The current study examined the nature of the associations among set-shifting and anxiety, 
depression, obsessionality, perfectionism, emotional reappraisal, dieting, systemizing, and 
personality factors in a normal sample and in subsets of participants with higher levels of eating, 
mood, and anxiety pathology. The goal was to provide more precision and context for 
understanding set-shifting in general and in subsets of individuals with higher levels of 
psychopathology. The current results make clear that set-shifting is a complex construct with 
multifaceted associations. Perhaps more significant than the specific findings for each variable, 
this research underscores the importance of defining this construct more exactly and evaluating 
its associations more thoroughly in future research. 
The challenge of measuring set-shifting 
The inconsistency seen among measures of set-shifting and their small intercorrelations 
indicate the difficulties in utilizing these neuropsychological tasks as sole representations of set-
shifting. As noted in the introduction, the process of set-shifting likely involves multiple 
components, including the ability to learn new rules and to switch efficiently between rules. This 
may account for several of the small correlations among the neuropsychological measures of set-
shifting, and suggests why associations between different neuropsychological tasks and the same 
independent variable might differ in size and direction. For instance, the association between the 
WCST outcomes and anxiety in the subgroup of participants with elevated eating concerns 
indicated that increased anxiety was related to poorer set-shifting, but the TMT suggested the 
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exact opposite relation. Understanding the differences between these two measures helps to 
explain these results: the WCST more clearly measures the ability to learn a new rule, while the 
TMT appears to capture the ability to alternate between two given rules. These two tasks may 
differ meaningfully from each other, resulting in a unique pattern of associations.  
The current conceptualization of set-shifting, however, does not sufficiently explain why 
tasks that appear to measure the same component of set-shifting (e.g., the total number of errors 
on the Brixton task and the number of perseverative errors on the WCST) had only small and 
non-significant correlations. These discrepancies may be best explained by literature examining 
how the involvement of other mental abilities or processes may confound the measurement of 
set-shifting (Ionescu, 2012). 
Multiple studies have provided evidence for the role of working memory and attention in 
the WCST task. Through altering the number of potential rules to govern sorting, it becomes 
possible to manipulate working memory load and directly examine how it impacts performance 
on the WCST (Lange, Kroger, Steinke, Seer, Dengler, & Kopp, 2016). If working memory were 
not involved in the task, we would not expect this change in load to influence performance; 
however, several studies have supported the hypothesis that working memory load affects 
performance on card-sorting tasks (Hartman, Steketee, Silva, Lanning, & Andersson, 2003; 
Lange et al., 2016). Further, in patients with schizophrenia, set-shifting deficits that have been 
attributed to impairment in cognitive flexibility were significantly decreased when working 
memory ability was statistically controlled (Hartman et al., 2003). Imaging data have also been 
used to further substantiate hypotheses regarding the necessity of working memory when 
completing the WCST task (Lie, Specht, Marshall, & Fink, 2006; Monchi, Petrides, Petre, 
Worsley, & Dagher, 2001). 
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 Beyond working memory, set-shifting also relies on attentional capacities. During a 
paradigm like the WCST, participants must not only attend to feedback given about the validity 
of the rule being used, but must also be able to switch their attention to new features of the card 
(e.g., color, shape, number). In a sample of children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD), investigators found that age and IQ accounted for differences between ADHD 
participants and healthy control participants on outcomes related to switching rules, but did not 
account for the finding that the ADHD group failed to maintain set more frequently than healthy 
controls (Mullane & Corkum, 2007). The authors propose that this inability to maintain set may 
represent a failure to sustain attention, consistent with previous literature using factor analysis to 
analyze WCST responses in children with ADHD (Pineda, Ardila, Rosselli, Cadavid, Mancheno, 
& Mejia, 1998). In these analyses, ability to maintain set loaded on a different factor from the 
outcomes hypothesized to be reflective of flexibility (Pineda et al., 1998). Neuroimaging data 
documenting increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex associated with increases in task 
demand provide further evidence of the involvement of attentional networks during this task 
(Lie, Specht, Marshall, & Fink, 2006).  
 Findings indicating the involvement of other cognitive processes in tasks such as the 
WCST support the idea that other abilities may confound results on these tasks and make it 
difficult to isolate specific components of set-shifting. This likely helps to explain why different 
tasks hypothesized to measure the same component of set-shifting may not be strongly related. 
Although the WCST and the Brixton both measure errors, the WCST is widely accepted as a 
complicated task that may require greater involvement from other cognitive abilities compared to 
the Brixton task. For instance, the WCST involves attention to different features of the cards, 
whereas the Brixton task asks participants to attend only to the movement of one circle. 
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Additionally, the instructions for the Brixton task explicitly tell participants that the rule 
governing circle movement will change, whereas participants are left to deduce the presence of 
rule changes on their own during the WCST (Tchanturia et al., 2012). Unfortunately, current 
research has not examined the contribution of other cognitive abilities to performance on the 
Brixton task as thoroughly as has been done with the WCST. Potential explanations for 
differences between the two tasks are thus only hypotheses. Future studies could include 
manipulations meant to influence other cognitive abilities involved in the task to better determine 
the extent to which they impact outcomes.  
Set-Shifting and Cognitive Flexibility 
“Set-shifting” has been included as a variable in a variety of contexts within the field of 
psychology, and has recently been utilized to represent a type of cognitive flexibility that may be 
inefficient in several domains of psychopathology. As previously discussed, the construct itself 
grew from work with patients who had suffered traumatic brain injury and was adopted by 
researchers and clinicians who noted that this variable might have parallels to inefficiencies in 
cognitive flexibility observed in some groups of psychiatric patients. In particular, researchers 
hoping to develop more efficacious treatments for eating disorders have relied upon a 
hypothesized connection between diminished set-shifting as measured by neuropsychological 
tasks and the cognitive inflexibility observed in patients (Galimberti et al., 2012; Tchanturia et 
al., 2012; Wu et al., 2014). There is limited evidence supporting the connection between these 
two constructs, however, and the present study suggests that they may not have the association 
that has previously been assumed.  
The self-report measure of cognitive flexibility and the neuropsychological tasks included 
in the current study have both been used to represent the aforementioned cognitive inflexibility 
observed in patients (Wu et al., 2014), but the degree to which they are capturing the same 
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construct is unclear. The questions asked in the self-report measure do not appear to represent the 
same processes experienced in the neuropsychological tasks (e.g., “When I encounter difficult 
situations, I feel like I am losing control”) and the low correlations among these measures 
support the hypothesis that they are measuring two distinct processes. This absence of 
association is consistent with previous literature (Johnco, Withruh, & Rapee, 2014). Further, the 
factor analysis was unable to produce a good-fitting reduction into clear factors. Although the 
inability to produce an adequate solution does not necessarily mean that they are measuring 
different constructs, it speaks to the need for future research to better identify how these 
measures relate.  
Additionally, the neuropsychological tasks and the self-report measures evidenced 
different associations with the independent variables, further supporting the hypothesis that the 
two may not be measuring the same construct. As will be discussed in greater detail in 
subsequent sections, depression, obsessionality, multiple dimensions of perfectionism, emotional 
reappraisal, systemizing, and dimensions of personality were each related to the self-report 
measure and apparently unrelated to the neuropsychological measures in the full sample. This 
could indicate that these variables are related to self-perceived flexibility but not to flexible task 
performance, but again, further research must be conducted to determine the nature of the 
relation between the two types of measures.  
Future research should also consider which measure, if either, best represents the type of 
cognitive flexibility clinical psychologists intend to examine. While it could be argued that the 
self-report measure has limited validity due to poor insight or demand characteristics, it should 
not be assumed that the processes captured by the neuropsychological tasks are better 
approximations of the clinical rigidity observed in individuals with psychopathology. The types 
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of questions included in the self-report measure appear to subsume the cognitive inflexibility 
referenced by clinical psychologists in a way that the tasks do not (e.g., “When in difficult 
situations, I consider multiple options before deciding how to behave”). This line of research is 
particularly important because of the recent trend to utilize improved neuropsychological task 
performance as evidence of impact on cognitive flexibility in studies examining the efficacy of 
treatments that target set-shifting. 	
Set-Shifting and the Independent Variables in the Full Sample 
 The exploratory nature of the current research allowed an examination of the associations 
between set-shifting and a wide range of variables in a normal sample. This was particularly 
warranted because of the absence of previous research assessing how set-shifting functions in 
normal individuals. The number of variables included and the exploratory nature of the study, 
however, also resulted in a complex pattern of findings that is likely to include a number of false 
positives. Although potential explanations for each result could be sought, it is important to note 
the risk of over-interpretation.  Further, the number of variables coupled with the previously 
discussed difficulties in understanding the associations between set-shifting and cognitive 
flexibility limit the extent to which general statements can be made about the associations 
between each independent variable and “set-shifting” as a whole. Across many of these 
variables, there are discrepancies between their associations with the neuropsychological tasks 
and the self-report measure, as well as between specific neuropsychological tasks. As discussed, 
these inconsistencies have multiple possible interpretations. The various measures may be 
capturing different constructs or specific dimensions of the same construct, may have distinct 
sensitivities for variance in set-shifting, or may be confounded by involvement from other 
cognitive abilities. Nonetheless, the current research highlights specific potential connections 
between set-shifting and the independent variables in the full sample. 
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 Anxiety, depression, and obsessionality appear to relate to set-shifting in a way that is 
consistent with current conceptualizations of these variables as interfering with the ability to 
attend to information inconsistent with one’s set or beliefs and with treatment protocols that 
challenge patients to incorporate that contradictory information into their thought processes 
(Beck, 1995). Previous literature detected no association between anxiety and set-shifting in 
samples of patients with eating disorders (Holliday et al., 2005; Roberts, Tchanturia, & Treasure, 
2010), informing the hypothesis that anxiety and set-shifting would not be related. However, 
results indicated that higher levels of anxiety were generally associated with worse self-
perceived cognitive flexibility and difficulty with initial and subsequent rule learning. Similarly, 
the self-report measure of set-shifting was related to depression and obsessionality in the 
hypothesized directions, such that increases in these variables were related to decreases in self-
perceived cognitive flexibility.  
 The associations among the dimensions of perfectionism and set-shifting were fairly 
consistent with previous literature and support the current understanding of perfectionism as a 
potentially maladaptive quality that can be related to rigidity (Flett & Hewitt, 2006). High levels 
of self-doubt, anxiety concerning mistakes, parental expectations, parental criticism, and 
organization were associated with decreased ability to respond flexibly, while elevated personal 
standards were related to better self-perceived flexibility. This is potentially reflective of a 
meaningful difference in the impact of internally versus externally imposed standards on ability 
to think flexibly and highlights the need to represent perfectionism as a multifaceted construct. 
Future research should attempt to replicate these findings, as no previous studies included 
neuropsychological tasks, self-reported cognitive flexibility, and a multidimensional measure of 
perfectionism. 
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Correlations among set-shifting and rigid dieting and those for set-shifting and emotion 
reappraisal were consistent with hypotheses. Increased use of emotion reappraisal strategies was 
associated with greater self-perceived flexibility. As previously discussed, use of emotion 
reappraisal strategies involves the ability to see a situation from multiple perspectives and the 
findings from the current study support the idea that this is related to general cognitive 
flexibility. Higher levels of emotional suppression were also related to worse self-perceived 
ability to see situations flexibly. Frequent use of rigid dieting practices was also associated with 
decreased ability to learn new rules and more perseveration. Although direction cannot be 
determined, it appears that general cognitive inflexibility is consistent with rigidity in both of 
these domains. 
 The association between systemizing and set-shifting did not support initial hypotheses. 
Greater tendencies towards rule finding were associated with increased self-reported set-shifting 
ability and predicted the greatest amount of variance in self-perceived ability to see situations as 
controllable. Conceptually, systemizing tendencies would likely support initial rule learning and 
motivation to deduce a system that produces order in difficult situations. Notably, previous 
literature indicates that patients with high-functioning autism exhibit deficits in set-shifting 
(Kaland, Smith, & Mortensen, 2007) and the full sample did not exhibit an association between 
systemizing and the neuropsychological tasks. This might point towards a nonlinear association 
between systemizing and set-shifting, such that systemizing is supportive of set-shifting ability 
only at particular levels, or could indicate a meaningful difference between the 
neuropsychological tasks and the self-report measure, as already discussed. 
 Extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and intellect all 
related to better self-perceived cognitive flexibility, with agreeableness and intellectual 
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tendencies predicting the greatest amount of variance in self-reported ability to see multiple 
solutions. Theoretically, increases in trust and amicability could allow for a greater willingness 
to examine situations from multiple perspectives rather than holding onto one’s initial set. 
Further, it makes conceptual sense that increases in curiosity and imaginative capacity would be 
strongly associated with ability to use multiple angles when examining a situation. This is the 
first study to examine the correlations between these domains of personality and set-shifting, 
necessitating replication, but these findings may illuminate a context for understanding how set-
shifting interacts with personality.  
Set-Shifting, the Independent Variables, and Eating Disorder Symptomatology 
Although not planned, the current study was also able to examine participants with 
potential eating disorder symptomatology separately and compare the pattern of results to those 
seen in the full sample. The performance of these individuals on the neuropsychological 
outcomes was generally consistent with previous literature (Abbate-Daga et al., 2014; Holliday 
et al., 2005; Tchanturia et al., 2004; Tchanturia et al., 2011). As will be discussed in more detail, 
some of the associations between the neuropsychological tasks and the independent variables 
were consistent with those seen in the full sample, but several highlighted potential differences in 
this subgroup. Throughout interpretation of these results, however, it is important to note that the 
specific measure utilized in the current study (i.e., EAT-26) is limited in its capacity to identify 
participants with eating disorders. Consequently, this subset of participants can only be said to 
have elevated eating disorder symptomatology and it should not be assumed that conclusions 
about this group would transfer to groups with diagnosed eating disorders, or that the current 
findings would align with previous literature examining set-shifting in patients with diagnosed 
eating disorders. Further, the number of participants identified with elevated eating and weight 
concerns yielded insufficient power to detect group differences on many of the outcome 
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measures. The MANOVA indicated that there was at least one statistically significant group 
difference, but the overall pattern of results on the set-shifting measures did not appear strikingly 
different from that seen in the lesser eating pathology sample.  Future research should be 
powered to statistically examine differences across all outcomes and determine whether set-
shifting inefficiencies appear at a certain threshold of pathology.  
Set-shifting and anxiety, depression, emotional reappraisal, and several domains of 
personality appear to have similar associations in this subgroup as those seen in the full sample. 
Higher anxiety and depression were associated with poorer self-reported set-shifting and more 
difficulty learning rules, though it should be noted that anxiety and depression in this subgroup 
could be driven by dietary restraint or restriction and consequently may be qualitatively different 
from the anxiety and depression seen in the full sample. Similarly, higher levels of emotional 
reappraisal were related to better self-perceived flexibility and rule learning. Further, 
extraversion, agreeableness, emotional stability, and intellect were related to better self-reported 
flexibility and increased ability to learn new rules in this subgroup of participants. The nature of 
these associations appears consistent with the full sample.  
In contrast, high levels of personal standards and conscientiousness were associated with 
poorer set-shifting on neuropsychological tasks. For individuals with more pronounced levels of 
eating concerns, it appears that these variables function differently with respect to ability to think 
flexibly. They may serve as barriers to flexible thinking and could thus be considered important 
to manage in treatment. Mixed results were seen with respect to obsessionality and systemizing, 
such that higher levels of these variables were related to worse performance on some tasks and 
better performance on others. Further, high levels of emotional suppression and rigid dieting 
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were surprisingly related to better set-shifting in this subgroup. It is unclear how to interpret 
these mixed findings without additional research. 
Beyond these specific findings, several general patterns are noteworthy. The number of 
significant associations between the independent variables and the neuropsychological tasks was 
substantially greater in this subset of participants. Depression, obsessionality, multiple 
dimensions of perfectionism, emotional reappraisal, dieting strategies, and several domains of 
personality were related to neuropsychological tasks in this subgroup, but not in the full sample. 
This could indicate that these variables are related to self-perceived flexibility in a normal 
sample and only extend to task-based flexibility at higher levels of pathology, but again, 
differences in pattern between the two types of measurement are difficult to interpret. 
Additionally, there were numerous inconsistencies among the associations between these 
variables and individual neuropsychological tasks used to measure set-shifting. As previously 
indicated, these apparent discrepancies could also be explained through numerous mechanisms. 
Further, it is likely that at least several are chance findings.  
The discrepancies between the self-report measures of cognitive flexibility and the 
neuropsychological tasks measuring set-shifting were particularly striking in this subset of 
participants. High obsessionality, concern over mistakes, parental expectations, personal 
standards, organization, and conscientiousness were all related to better self-reported flexibility, 
but worse task-based set-shifting. Yet again, these discrepancies have multiple possible 
interpretations, including disparities between self-perceived flexibility and task-based flexibility 
and differences in intended populations for the two types of measures. Yet, this pattern was not 
seen in the full sample and is consistent with clinical descriptions of eating disorder patients as 
possessing limited insight into the problematic nature of their behaviors. If this is a further 
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manifestation of the egosyntonic nature of eating disorders, it is particularly informative for 
researchers studying set-shifting in patients with eating disorders and clinicians who hope to 
increase flexibility in their patients. 
Set-Shifting, the Independent Variables, and Other Symptomatology 
 Although several correlations appeared to be distinctive to individuals with greater levels 
of eating pathology, examination of the full sample and this subgroup alone could lead to errors 
in interpretation. Perhaps these correlations are also present in groups with other forms of 
psychopathology, rather than being unique to individuals with eating and weight concerns. To 
explore this possibility, two additional subgroups were created to examine patterns in 
participants with elevated depressive and anxiety symptomatology. It is important to note that 
there is a degree of overlap among these groups, as individuals often have elevated scores in 
multiple domains of psychopathology; in addition, there is a large discrepancy in sample sizes 
across groups. Nonetheless, visual inspection of the overall pattern of results gives greater 
context for interpreting the nature of the differences seen between the full sample and the 
subgroup with greater eating disorder symptomatology. 
The associations among perfectionism, rigid dieting, and set-shifting in the subset of 
participants with elevated eating concerns appear to differ from those seen in the groups with 
greater depressive and anxiety symptomatology.  Perfectionism was generally associated with 
less perseveration (i.e., better set-shifting) in the group with depressive symptomatology and 
showed negligible correlations across outcomes in the group with higher anxiety. Yet, 
participants with more prominent eating pathology exhibited significant correlations among 
perfectionism and set-shifting, suggesting that perfectionism was generally associated with less 
flexibility. Similarly, rigid dieting was largely unrelated to set-shifting in the groups with 
depressive and anxiety concerns, but was related to better set-shifting in the group with elevated 
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eating pathology. This may highlight a particularly important area for future research focusing on 
cognitive treatments for eating disorders.  
 Examination of these subgroups also suggests that the nature of the associations among 
personality and task-based set-shifting differ in individuals with elevated eating pathology. The 
correlations among the dimensions of personality measured and perseveration were more 
pronounced in individuals with greater eating pathology as compared to those with elevated 
depressive and anxiety symptomatology. Further, the association between set-shifting and 
conscientiousness in these two subgroups more closely mirrored that seen in the full sample as 
compared to those in the group with greater eating disorder symptomatology. It appears that 
these associations may be not common across forms of psychopathology, perhaps indicating a 
specific role of personality in flexibility for individuals with elevated eating and weight 
concerns. As this is the first study to examine the nature of these connections, it is important for 
future research to continue examining the role that personality might play in flexibility. Such a 
series of studies might also have implications for variables that moderate response to treatments 
targeting flexibility. 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
To the best of this author’s knowledge, this study represents the first attempt to examine 
the correlates of set-shifting in a normal sample. Given the social value placed on ability to adapt 
to difficult situations, a clearer understanding of these associations is worthwhile in and of itself. 
It allows for an initial profile of how an individual with efficient set-shifting might be described 
using other variables. Though the study design cannot determine causality, nor answer the 
question of how self-reported cognitive flexibility is related to neuropsychological measures of 
set-shifting, it highlights factors that may be related to flexible responding. Further, it indicates 
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the potential for multiple pathways to achieve or hinder flexibility, providing a better context for 
how these cognitive processes could function in daily life amidst other variables.  
To understand the importance of these associations, however, knowledge about the extent 
to which cognitive flexibility as measured by self-report and neuropsychological tasks translates 
to flexible cognition and behavior in everyday circumstances is crucially needed. Previous 
research appears to generalize findings from neuropsychological tasks to behavior, but no 
research has directly examined transference to flexible behavior. Treatment protocols targeting 
set-shifting inefficiencies generally utilize changes in neuropsychological assessment as the sole 
outcome (Lang, Treasure, & Tchanturia, 2015), despite findings documenting the impact of 
practice effects on these tasks. Studies that include both neuropsychological tasks and self-report 
measures of cognitive flexibility tend to show no improvement in the self-report measures after 
CRT (Juarascio, Manasse, Espel, Kerrigan, & Forman, 2015). Further, research that attempts to 
measure functional impact through quality of life suggests that any effect of CRT on quality of 
life and eating disorder symptomatology is due to a process other than improvement on 
neuropsychological tasks (Dingemans et al., 2013). Current evidence suggests that it may be 
inappropriate to generalize performance on isolated neuropsychological tasks to behavior and 
cognition in day-to-day situations. If this is the case, the clinical meaning of these associations 
among set-shifting and the independent variables is greatly diminished. 
An understanding of how neuropsychological task performance relates to functional 
flexibility should be a focus of future research, as this would allow researchers and clinicians to 
better determine the clinical importance of inefficiencies in set-shifting and the value of CRT 
protocols. Future investigations could include measures of quality of life to determine the extent 
to which set-shifting impairment relates to quality of life above and beyond other 
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psychopathology. Further, a single-case research design could be utilized to gather preliminary 
data on how increasing set-shifting performance measured by neuropsychological tasks translates 
to daily flexibility in eating, as well as other day-to-day tasks that require some adaptability. 
Given the prevalence of set-shifting difficulties across other domains of psychopathology, the 
value of this research would not be limited to patients with eating disorders. 
 The current study adds to the body of literature examining the nature of set-shifting in 
both normal samples and those with greater eating disorder symptomatology, but is not without 
its limitations. The use of a college student sample limits generalizability to the broader 
population, particularly to adolescents and children whose cognitive capacity is known to be 
continually developing. However, eating pathology is common in college students (White, 
Reynolds-Malear, & Cordero, 2011), making an understanding of set-shifting in this sample 
particularly relevant. The correlational nature of the study also prohibits determining 
directionality and the number of analyses conducted in this study make it highly likely that a 
subset of the statistically significant findings occurred by chance. Further, the absence of a 
measure of flexibility in an ecologically valid setting leaves a gap in the ability to interpret the 
extent to which the self-report and neuropsychological measures of set-shifting translate to 
functional flexibility. 
Despite these limitations, this work adds to the growing body of literature attempting to 
understand how neuropsychological functioning impacts psychopathology. It provides context 
for those researchers and clinicians who hypothesize that a deficit in set-shifting ability is a 
causal factor in eating disorders. Through understanding how set-shifting operates in a normal 
sample and in samples of individuals with other pathology, researchers and clinicians will be 
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better equipped to understand how set-shifting ability might differ for patients with eating 
disorders. 
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Appendix A: Tables 	
Table 2. Bivariate correlations between measures of set-shifting and personality and behavioral 
characteristics. 
 CFI Alt CFI Con Brixton WCST 
Trials to 
1st 
WCST 
Cat. 
Comp. 
WCST 
Pers. 
Errors 
TMT  
B : A  
HADS 
Anx 
-.26** -.48** .05 .15* -.17* .06 -.03 
HADS 
Dep 
-.30** -.40** .06 -.04 -.01 -.01 -.01 
BDI -.29** -.46** .05 -.003 -.08 .02 .05 
MOCI -.14 -.28** -.004 -.05 -.11 .06 .06 
STAI_X1 -.30* -.47** .07 .02 -.07 .07 .05 
STAI_X2 -.33** -.56** .04 -.02 -.06 .02 -.01 
FMPS 
Conc. 
-.07 -.30** -.03 -.09 -.02 .12 .04 
FMPS 
Doubts 
-.19** -.41** -.03 -.03 -.08 .13 -.01 
FMPS 
PE 
.04 -.07 -.12 -.03 -.07 .18* .08 
FMPS 
PC 
-.03 -.16* -.11 -.06 .01 .12 -.01 
FMPS 
PS 
.30** .25** .03 -.03 .09 .05 .09 
FMPS 
Org. 
.08 .05 .07 -.06 -.02 .17* .09 
ERQ 
Reap. 
.24** .25** .05 -.03 -.10 .09 -.03 
ERQ 
Supp. 
-.05 -.17* -.04 -.11 -.10 .10 .09 
Flex. 
Diet 
.14 .01 .07 -.04 -.13 .14 .06 
Rigid 
Diet 
.03 -.08 .05 -.05 -.16* .17* .03 
SQ .40** .40** .09 .05 -.02 .10 .11 
EAT .002 -.12 .09 <.001 -.18* .10 .04 
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Table 2 (continued). Bivariate correlations between measures of set-shifting and personality 
characteristics. 
 CFI Alt CFI Con Brixton WCST 
Trials to 
1st 
WCST 
Cat. 
Comp. 
WCST 
Pers. 
Errors 
TMT  
B : A  
IPIP 
Extra. 
.39** .43** .03 .04 -.01 .04 -.003 
IPIP 
Agree. 
.39** .22** -.01 .14 .01 -.02 -.004 
IPIP 
Consc. 
.21** .28** .04 -.04 .05 .05 .05 
IPIP Em. 
Stab. 
.27** .46** -.10 -.03 .09 -.06 -.09 
IPIP 
Intell. 
.50** .37** .08 .12 .09 -.06 .03 
* p<.05 
**p<.01 
HADS Anx indicates Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale – Anxiety; HADS Dep, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale - Depression; BDI, 
Beck Depression Inventory; MOCI, Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory; STAI_X1, State Trait Anxiety Inventory - State Anxiety; 
STAI_X2, State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait Anxiety; FMPS, Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale; Conc., FMPS – Concerns about 
Mistakes; FMPS Doubts, FMPS – Doubts about Actions; FMPS PE, FMPS – Parental Expectations; FMPS PS, FMPS – Personal Standards; 
FMPS Org., FMPS – Organization; ERQ, Emotion Regulation Questionnaire;  Reap., ERQ – Reappraisal; ERQ Supp., ERQ – Suppression; Flex 
Diet, Flexible Control Dieting; Rigid Diet, Rigid Control Dieting; SQ, Systemizing Quotient; EAT, Eating Attitudes Test; IPIP, International 
Personality Item Pool;, IPIP Extra, IPIP Extraversion; IPIP Agree, IPIP Agreeableness; IPIP Consc.; IPIP Conscientiousness; IPIP Em. Stab., 
IPIP Emotional Stability; IPIP Intellect/Imagination; TMT B : A, Trail Making Test ratio of time B : time A; CFI Alt, Cognitive Flexibility 
Inventory – Alternatives; CFI Con., Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Control; Brixton, Brixton total errors; WCST, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; 
Cat. Comp., Categories Complete; Pers. Err., Perseverative Errors; TMT B : A, Trail Making Test ratio of time B : time A 
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Table 5. Bivariate correlations between measures of set-shifting and personality and behavioral 
characteristics for participants with EAT scores greater than 19 (n = 27). 
 CFI Alt CFI Con Brixton WCST 
Trials to 
1st 
WCST 
Cat. 
Comp. 
WCST 
Pers. 
Errors 
TMT  
B : A  
HADS 
Anx 
-.19 -.15 .31 .09 -.06 .03 -.22 
HADS 
Dep 
-.14 -.14 .19 .26 .13 .24 .20 
BDI -.25 .04 .10 .29 .06 -.02 -.16 
MOCI .01 .16 .17 .08 .30 -.17 .11 
STAI_X1 -.21 -.07 .12 .20 .13 .04 -.04 
STAI_X2 -.33 -.11 .11 .23 .13 -.06 -.15 
FMPS 
Conc. 
.26 -.05 .04 .26 .16 .41* -.17 
FMPS 
Doubts 
.13 -.10 .02 -.04 .17 .29 -.04 
FMPS 
PE 
.26 .15 -.28 .14 .01 .23 .03 
FMPS 
PC 
.13 .01 -.09 .37 .21 .29 -.32 
FMPS 
PS 
.44* .20 -.03 .17 .15 .23 -.06 
FMPS 
Org. 
.35 .06 .31 -.13 .07 .27 -.09 
ERQ 
Reap. 
.15 .10 -.02 -.51** -.07 -.03 -.08 
ERQ 
Supp. 
-.07 -.14 -.06 -.34 .22 -.01 -.07 
Flex. 
Diet 
-.10 -.11 .08 -.01 -.13 -.16 -.60** 
Rigid 
Diet 
-.07 -.04 -.29 -.17 .18 .01 -.35 
SQ .29 .45* .18 -.23 .14 .15 .26 
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Table 5 (continued). Bivariate correlations between measures of set-shifting and personality 
characteristics for those participants with EAT scores greater than 19 (n= 27). 
 CFI Alt CFI Con Brixton WCST 
Trials to 
1st 
WCST 
Cat. 
Comp. 
WCST 
Pers. 
Errors 
TMT  
B : A  
IPIP 
Extra. 
.32 .03 -.03 -.12 .003 -.02 .01 
IPIP 
Agree. 
.19 .13 -.29 -.05 .12 -.33 -.09 
IPIP 
Consc. 
.26 .38 .27 .15 -.02 .13 -.13 
IPIP Em. 
Stab. 
.12 .14 .09 -.40* .08 .08 .15 
IPIP 
Intell. 
.56** .26 .10 -.11 .21 -.31 -.23 
* p<.05 
**p<.01 
HADS Anx indicates Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale – Anxiety; HADS Dep, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale - Depression; BDI, 
Beck Depression Inventory; MOCI, Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory; STAI_X1, State Trait Anxiety Inventory X1; STAI_X1, State 
Trait Anxiety Inventory X2; FMPS, Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale; Conc., FMPS – Concerns about Mistakes; FMPS Doubts, 
FMPS – Doubts about Actions; FMPS PE, FMPS – Parental Expectations; FMPS PS, FMPS – Personal Standards; FMPS Org., FMPS – 
Organization; ERQ, Emotion Regulation Questionnaire;  Reap., ERQ – Reappraisal; ERQ Supp., ERQ – Suppression; Flex Diet, Flexible Control 
Dieting; Rigid Diet, Rigid Control Dieting; SQ, Systemizing Quotient; CFI Alt, Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Alternatives; CFI Con., 
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Control; Brixton, Brixton total errors; WCST, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Cat. Comp., Categories Complete; 
Pers. Err., Perseverative Errors; IPIP, International Personality Item Pool;, IPIP Extra, IPIP Extraversion; IPIP Agree, IPIP Agreeableness; IPIP 
Consc.; IPIP Conscientiousness; IPIP Em. Stab., IPIP Emotional Stability; IPIP Intellect/Imagination; TMT B : A, Trail Making Test ratio of time 
B : time A 
  
	88	
Table 7. Comparison of the impact of the independent variables on self-report and 
neuropsychological assessments of set-shifting and cognitive flexibility in both the full sample 
and higher eating pathology groups. 
 
 Higher Eating Pathology 
Group 
Full sample 
 Self-report Neuropsychological 
Tasks  
Self-
report 
Neuropsychological 
Tasks 
High anxiety Worse SS Worse SS 
 (Brixton, Trials to 
1st) 
Better SS 
(TMT) 
Worse 
SS  
Worse SS 
(Categories, Trials 
to 1st) 
High depression Worse SS  Worse SS  
(Brixton, Trials to 
1st, Pers. Errors, 
TMT) 
Worse 
SS  
- 
High 
obsessionality 
Better SS  Worse SS 
(Brixton) 
Better SS  
(Categories, Pers. 
Errors) 
Worse 
SS  
- 
High concern over 
mistakes 
Better SS Worse SS  
(Trials to 1st, Pers. 
Errors) 
Worse 
SS  
- 
High doubts about 
actions 
- Worse SS  
(Pers. errors) 
Worse 
SS 
- 
High parental 
expectations 
Better SS Worse SS  
(Pers. Errors) 
Better SS  
(Brixton) 
- Worse SS  
(Pers. Errors) 
High parental 
criticism 
- Worse SS  
(Trials to 1st, Pers. 
Errors, Categories) 
Better SS  
(TMT) 
Worse 
SS  
- 
High personal 
standards 
Better SS Worse SS  
(Pers. Errors) 
Better SS - 
High organization Better SS  Worse SS 
(Brixton, Pers. 
Errors) 
- Worse SS  
(Pers. Errors) 
SS indicates set-shifting; Trials to 1st, trials needed to achieve first Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) category; Pers. Errors, 
WCST perseverative errors; Categories, number of WCST categories completed; TMT, Trail Making Task; Brixton, number of 
errors on the Brixton Test; “-“, no association  
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Table 7 (continued). Comparison of the impact of the independent variables on self-report and 
neuropsychological assessments of set-shifting and cognitive flexibility in both the full sample 
and higher eating pathology groups. 
 
 ED Group Full sample 
 Self-report Neuropsychological 
Tasks  
Self-
report 
Neuropsychological 
Tasks 
High emotional 
reappraisal 
Better SS Better SS  
(Trials to 1st) 
Better SS - 
High emotional 
suppression 
Worse SS  Better SS  
(Trials to 1st) 
Worse 
SS  
- 
High flexible 
dieting 
- Better SS  
(TMT) 
- - 
High rigid dieting - Better SS  
(TMT, Brixton) 
- Worse SS 
(Categories, Pers. 
Errors) 
High systemizing Better SS Better SS  
(Trials to 1st) 
Worst SS  
(TMT, Brixton) 
Better SS - 
High extraversion Better SS - Better SS - 
High agreeableness Better SS Better SS  
(Brixton, Pers. 
Errors) 
Better SS - 
High 
conscientiousness 
Better SS Worse SS  
(Brixton) 
Better SS - 
High emotional 
stability 
- Better SS  
(Trials to 1st) 
Better SS - 
High intellect Better SS Better SS 
(Categories, Pers. 
Errors, TMT) 
Better SS - 
SS indicates set-shifting; Trials to 1st, trials needed to achieve first Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) category; Pers. Errors, 
WCST perseverative errors; Categories, number of WCST categories completed; TMT, Trail Making Task; Brixton, number of 
errors on the Brixton Test; “-“, no association  
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Table 9. Bivariate correlations between measures of set-shifting and personality and behavioral 
characteristics for participants with BDI scores greater than 20 (n = 45). 
 CFI Alt CFI Con Brixton WCST 
Trials to 
1st 
WCST 
Cat. 
Comp. 
WCST 
Pers. 
Errors 
TMT  
B : A  
HADS 
Anx 
-.08 -.27 .05 .46** -.09 -.07 .02 
HADS 
Dep 
-.16 -.17 -.04 -.01 .14 -.31* -.11 
MOCI .06 .09 -.05 -.23 .15 -.08 .002 
STAI_X1 -.05 -.05 .09 .43** -.03 .07 .12 
STAI_X2 -.13 -.32* .06 .39** -.01 .04 -.02 
FMPS 
Conc. 
.01 -.06 -.13 -.16 .23 -.06 -.22 
FMPS 
Doubts 
-.10 -.13 -.27 -.19 .002 -.04 -.14 
FMPS 
PE 
.05 .01 -.17 .02 -.08 .06 .14 
FMPS 
PC 
.16 .18 -.23 .05 .17 .06 -.04 
FMPS 
PS 
.33* .44** .04 .03 .05 .05 -.14 
FMPS 
Org. 
.10 .17 -.23 -.20 -.07 .19 -.09 
ERQ 
Reap. 
.24 .25 -.01 -.22 -.22 .02 .14 
ERQ 
Supp. 
-.16 -.18 -.26 -.15 -.02 .04 .05 
Flex. 
Diet 
.30 .40** .02 -.05 -.17 .16 .05 
Rigid 
Diet 
.23 .30* .03 -.08 -.07 .05 -.15 
SQ .53** .53** .01 .04 .01 .14 .04 
EAT .09 .16 .26 .07 <.001 -.05 -.09 
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Table 9 (continued). Bivariate correlations between measures of set-shifting and personality 
characteristics for those participants with BDI scores greater than 20 (n = 45). 
 CFI Alt CFI Con Brixton WCST 
Trials to 
1st 
WCST 
Cat. 
Comp. 
WCST 
Pers. 
Errors 
TMT  
B : A  
IPIP 
Extra. 
.50** .40** .05 -.04 .04 .05 -.27 
IPIP 
Agree. 
.36* .22 .03 .24 -.01 .09 -.11 
IPIP 
Consc. 
.16 .21 -.13 -.17 -.01 .05 -.16 
IPIP Em. 
Stab. 
.13 .26 -.06 -.27 .20 .09 -.21 
IPIP 
Intell. 
.51** .32* .10 .22 .12 .09 .04 
* p<.05 
**p<.01 
HADS Anx indicates Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale – Anxiety; HADS Dep, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale - Depression; BDI, 
Beck Depression Inventory; MOCI, Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory; STAI_X1, State Trait Anxiety Inventory X1; STAI_X1, State 
Trait Anxiety Inventory X2; FMPS, Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale; Conc., FMPS – Concerns about Mistakes; FMPS Doubts, 
FMPS – Doubts about Actions; FMPS PE, FMPS – Parental Expectations; FMPS PS, FMPS – Personal Standards; FMPS Org., FMPS – 
Organization; ERQ, Emotion Regulation Questionnaire;  Reap., ERQ – Reappraisal; ERQ Supp., ERQ – Suppression; Flex Diet, Flexible Control 
Dieting; Rigid Diet, Rigid Control Dieting; SQ, Systemizing Quotient; CFI Alt, Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Alternatives; CFI Con., 
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Control; Brixton, Brixton total errors; WCST, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Cat. Comp., Categories Complete; 
Pers. Err., Perseverative Errors; IPIP, International Personality Item Pool;, IPIP Extra, IPIP Extraversion; IPIP Agree, IPIP Agreeableness; IPIP 
Consc.; IPIP Conscientiousness; IPIP Em. Stab., IPIP Emotional Stability; IPIP Intellect/Imagination; TMT B : A, Trail Making Test ratio of time 
B : time A 
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Table 10. Bivariate correlations between measures of set-shifting and personality and behavioral 
characteristics for participants with HADS Anxiety scores greater than 8 (n = 82). 
 CFI Alt CFI Con Brixton WCST 
Trials to 
1st 
WCST 
Cat. 
Comp. 
WCST 
Pers. 
Errors 
TMT  
B : A  
HADS 
Dep 
-.17 -.17 -.04 -.10 .15 -.20 -.08 
BDI -.15 -.33** -.03 .002 .04 -.16 .07 
MOCI .07 -.04 -.11 -.21 .03 -.02 .002 
STAI_X1 -.14 -.24* .02 .07 .07 -.04 .07 
STAI_X2 -.26* -.42** -.02 -.03 .07 -.11 -.01 
FMPS 
Conc. 
-.01 -.15 -.11 -.25* .15 -.07 -.10 
FMPS 
Doubts 
-.09 -.25* -.11 -.24* .03 .02 -.06 
FMPS 
PE 
.11 .02 -.13 -.15 -.001 .15 .07 
FMPS 
PC 
.10 .03 -.05 -.09 .05 .08 .01 
FMPS 
PS 
.39* .28* .03 -.03 .05 .03 .03 
FMPS 
Org. 
.17 .10 -.09 -.04 -.07 .14 .14 
ERQ 
Reap. 
.27* .36** .01 -.06 -.15 .05 .03 
ERQ 
Supp. 
-.03 -.12 .01 -.29** -.12 .17 .19 
Flex. 
Diet 
.22* .15 .17 -.08 -.12 .08 .12 
Rigid 
Diet 
.14 .14 .03 -.16 .02 .03 -.03 
SQ .46** .44** .06 .08 .10 -.004 .10 
EAT .06 .08 .12 -.04 -.02 -.04 -.05 
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Table 10 (continued). Bivariate correlations between measures of set-shifting and personality 
characteristics for those participants with HADS Anxiety scores greater than 8 (n = 82). 
 CFI Alt CFI Con Brixton WCST 
Trials to 
1st 
WCST 
Cat. 
Comp. 
WCST 
Pers. 
Errors 
TMT  
B : A  
IPIP 
Extra. 
.35** .41** .07 .08 .09 .04 -.11 
IPIP 
Agree. 
.49** .21 -.02 .23* .004 .02 -.05 
IPIP 
Consc. 
.17 .16 -.04 -.07 .03 .07 .04 
IPIP Em. 
Stab. 
.13 .29** -.02 -.08 .07 .07 -.18 
IPIP 
Intell. 
.44** .25* .10 .18 .20 -.08 .04 
* p<.05 
**p<.01 
HADS Anx indicates Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale – Anxiety; HADS Dep, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale - Depression; BDI, 
Beck Depression Inventory; MOCI, Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory; STAI_X1, State Trait Anxiety Inventory X1; STAI_X1, State 
Trait Anxiety Inventory X2; FMPS, Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale; Conc., FMPS – Concerns about Mistakes; FMPS Doubts, 
FMPS – Doubts about Actions; FMPS PE, FMPS – Parental Expectations; FMPS PS, FMPS – Personal Standards; FMPS Org., FMPS – 
Organization; ERQ, Emotion Regulation Questionnaire;  Reap., ERQ – Reappraisal; ERQ Supp., ERQ – Suppression; Flex Diet, Flexible Control 
Dieting; Rigid Diet, Rigid Control Dieting; SQ, Systemizing Quotient; CFI Alt, Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Alternatives; CFI Con., 
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Control; Brixton, Brixton total errors; WCST, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Cat. Comp., Categories Complete; 
Pers. Err., Perseverative Errors; IPIP, International Personality Item Pool;, IPIP Extra, IPIP Extraversion; IPIP Agree, IPIP Agreeableness; IPIP 
Consc.; IPIP Conscientiousness; IPIP Em. Stab., IPIP Emotional Stability; IPIP Intellect/Imagination; TMT B : A, Trail Making Test ratio of time 
B : time A 
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Table 11. Results of multiple regression analyses with set-shifting, as measured by the CFI 
Alternatives subscale, regressed on anxiety, depression, perfectionism, emotion regulation, 
systemizing, and IPIP personality factors. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i. * p<.05 
ii. **p<.01 
iii. HADS indicates Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; FMPS, Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale; ERQ, Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire; SQ, Systemizing Quotient; IPIP, International Personality Item Pool; CFI, Cognitive Flexibility Inventory 
iv. Given the current sample size and using a p<.05 standard of significance, the model had 80% power to detect a minimum f2=.04. f2=.1 
is considered a small effect size.  
 B SE 
HADS Anxiety -.33 
 
.19 
HADS Depression -.04 
 
.22 
FMPS Personal 
Standards  
.28* 
 
.13 
FMPS Doubts about 
Actions 
.04 
 
.19 
ERQ Reappraisal .05 
 
.08 
SQ .10 
 
.08 
IPIP Extraversion .10 
 
.08 
IPIP Agreeableness .28** 
 
.09 
IPIP 
Conscientiousness 
-.05 
 
.11 
IPIP Emotional 
Stability 
.08 
 
.09 
IPIP Intellect .33** 
 
.11 
	95	
Table 12. Results of multiple regression analyses with set-shifting, as measured by the CFI 
Control subscale, regressed on anxiety, depression, perfectionism, emotion regulation, 
systemizing, and IPIP personality factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i. p<.05 
ii. **p<.01 
iii. HADS indicates Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale;; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; STAI_X1, State Trait Anxiety Inventory 
X1; STAI_X1, State Trait Anxiety Inventory X2; FMPS, Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale; ERQ, Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire; SQ, Systemizing Quotient; IPIP, International Personality Item Pool; CFI, Cognitive Flexibility Inventory 
iv. Given the current sample size and using a p<.05 standard of significance, the model had 80% power to detect a minimum f2=.04. f2=.1 
is considered a small effect size. 
 
 B SE 
HADS Anxiety -.37* 
 
.16 
HADS Depression .001 
 
.18 
MOCI .01 .11 
 
FMPS Concerns over 
Mistakes 
-.17 
 
.09 
FMPS Parental 
Criticisms 
.23 .13 
FMPS Personal 
Standards  
.24* 
 
.11 
FMPS Doubts about 
Actions 
-.31 .19 
ERQ Reappraisal .05 
 
.07 
ERQ Suppression -.10 .11 
 
SQ .13** 
 
.05 
IPIP Extraversion .13 
 
.07 
IPIP Agreeableness .01 
 
.08 
IPIP 
Conscientiousness 
.05 
 
.09 
IPIP Emotional 
Stability 
.11 
 
.08 
IPIP 
Intellect/Imagination 
.08 
 
.09 
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Appendix B: Self-Report Measures 
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory  
Please use the scale below to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements.  
 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
agree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. I am good at “sizing up” situations. 
2. I have a hard time making decisions when faced with difficult decisions. 
3. I consider multiple options before making a decision. 
4. When I encounter difficult situations, I feel like I am losing control. 
5. I try to look at difficult situations from many different angles. 
6. I seek additional information not immediately available before attributing causes to 
behavior. 
7. When encountering difficult situations, I become so stressed that I cannot think of a way 
to resolve the situation. 
8. I try to think about things from another person’s point of view. 
9. I find it troublesome that there are so many different ways to deal with difficult 
situations. 
10. I am good at putting myself in others’ shoes. 
11. When I encounter difficult situations, I just don’t know what to do. 
12. It is important to look at difficult situations from many angles. 
13. When in difficult situations, I consider multiple options before deciding how to behave. 
14. I often look at a situation from different viewpoints. 
15. I am capable of overcoming the difficulties in life that I face. 
16. I consider all the available facts and information when attributing causes to behavior. 
17. I feel I have no power to change things in difficult situations. 
18. When I encounter difficult situations, I stop and try to think of several ways to resolve it. 
19. I can think of more than one way to resolve a difficult situation I’m confronted with. 
20. I consider multiple options before responding to difficult situations. 
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Hospital Anxiety and Depression Questionnaire 
Doctors are aware that emotions play an important part in most illnesses. If your doctor knows 
about these feelings, he will be able to help you more. This questionnaire is designed to help 
your doctor to know how you feel. Read each item and circle the reply which comes closest to 
how you have been feeling in the past week. Don’t take too long over your replies; your 
immediate reaction to each item will probably be more accurate than a long thought out 
response. 
1. I feel tense or “wound up”: 
a. Most of the time 
b. A lot of the time 
c. From time to time, occasionally 
d. Not at all 
2. I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy: 
a. Definitely as much 
b. Not quite so much 
c. Only a little 
d. Hardly at all 
3. I get a sort of frightened feeling as if something awful is about to happen: 
a. Very definitely and quite badly 
b. Yes, but not too badly 
c. A little, but it doesn’t worry me 
d. Not at all 
4. I can laugh and see the funny side of things: 
a. As much as I always could 
b. Not quite so much now 
c. Definitely not so much now 
d. Not at all 
5. Worrying thoughts go through my mind: 
a. A great deal of the time 
b. A lot of the time 
c. From time to time, but not too often 
d. Only occasionally 
6. I feel cheerful: 
a. Not at all 
b. Not often 
c. Sometimes 
d. Most of the time 
7. I can sit at ease and feel relaxed: 
a. Definitely 
b. Usually 
c. Not often 
d. Not at all 
8. I feel as if I am slowed down: 
a. Nearly all the time 
b. Very often 
c. Sometimes 
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d. Not at all 
9. I get a sort of frightened feeling like “butterflies” in the stomach: 
a. Not at all 
b. Occasionally 
c. Quite often 
d. Very often 
10. I have lost interest in my appearance: 
a. Definitely 
b. I don’t take so much care as I should 
c. I may not take quite as much care 
d. I take just as much care as ever 
11. I feel restless as if I have to be on the move: 
a. Very much indeed 
b. Quite a lot 
c. Not very much 
d. Not at all 
12. I look forward with enjoyment to things: 
a. As much as I ever did 
b. Rather less than I used to 
c. Definitely less than I used to 
d. Hardly at all 
13. I get sudden feelings of panic 
a. Very often indeed 
b. Quite often 
c. Not very often 
d. Not at all 
14. I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV program: 
a. Often 
b. Sometimes 
c. Not often 
d. Very seldom 
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Beck Depression Inventory—II 
This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group of statements 
carefully, and then pick out the one statement in each group that best describes the way you 
have been feeling during the past two weeks, including today. Circle the number beside the 
statement you have picked. If several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, circle 
the highest number for that group. Be sure that you do not choose more than one statement for 
any group, including Item 16 (Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in Appetite). 
1. Sadness 
0. I do not feel sad. 
1. I feel sad much of the time. 
2. I am sad all the time. 
3. I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. 
2. Pessimism 
0. I am not discouraged about my future. 
1. I feel more discouraged about my future than I used to be. 
2. I do not expect things to work out for me. 
3. I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse. 
3. Past Failure 
0. I do not feel like a failure. 
1. I have failed more than I should have. 
2. As I look back, I see a lot of failures. 
3. I feel I am a total failure as a person. 
4. Loss of Pleasure 
0. I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy. 
1. I don’t enjoy things as much as I used to. 
2. I get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
3. I can’t get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
5. Guilty Feelings 
0. I don’t feel particularly guilty. 
1. I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done. 
2. I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
3. I feel guilty all of the time. 
6. Punishment Feelings 
0. I don’t feel like I am being punished. 
1. I feel I may be punished. 
2. I expect to be punished. 
3. I feel like I am being punished. 
7. Self-Dislike 
0. I feel the same about myself as ever. 
1. I have lost confidence in myself. 
2. I am disappointed in myself. 
3. I dislike myself. 
8. Self-Criticalness 
0. I don’t criticize or blame myself more than usual. 
1. I am more critical of myself than I used to be. 
2. I criticize myself for all of my faults. 
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3. I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes 
0. I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1. I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
2. I would like to kill myself. 
3. I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
10. Crying 
0. I don’t cry anymore than I used to. 
1. I cry more than I used to. 
2. I cry over every little thing. 
3. I feel like crying, but I can’t. 
11. Agitation 
0. I am no more restless or wound up than usual. 
1. I feel more restless or wound up than usual. 
2. I am so restless or agitated that it’s hard to stay still. 
3. I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep moving or doing something. 
12. Loss of Interest 
0. I have not lost interest in other people or activities. 
1. I am less interested in other people or things than before. 
2. I have lost most of my interest in other people or things. 
3. It’s hard to get interested in anything. 
13. Indecisiveness 
0. I make decisions about as well as ever. 
1. I find it more difficult to make decisions than usual. 
2. I have much greater difficulty in making decisions than I used to. 
3. I have trouble making any decisions. 
14. Worthlessness 
0. I do not feel I am worthless. 
1. I don’t consider myself as worthwhile and useful as I used to. 
2. I feel more worthless as compared to other people. 
3. I feel utterly worthless. 
15. Loss of Energy 
0. I have as much energy as ever. 
1. I have less energy than I used to have. 
2. I don’t have enough energy to do very much. 
3. I don’t have enough energy to do anything. 
16. Changes in sleeping pattern. 
0. I have not experienced any change in my sleeping pattern. 
1.  
a) I sleep somewhat more than usual. 
b) I sleep somewhat less than usual. 
2.  
a) I sleep a lot more than usual. 
b) I sleep a lot less than usual. 
3.  
a) I sleep most of the day. 
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b) I wake up 1-2 hours early and can’t get back to sleep. 
17. Irritability 
0. I am no more irritable than usual. 
1. I am more irritable than usual. 
2. I am much more irritable than usual. 
3. I am irritable all the time. 
18. Changes in Appetite 
0. I have not experienced any change in my appetite. 
1.  
a) My appetite is somewhat less than usual. 
b) My appetite is somewhat more than usual. 
2.  
a) My appetite is much less than before. 
b) My appetite is much greater than usual. 
3.  
a) I have no appetite at all. 
b) I crave food all the time. 
19. Concentration Difficulty 
0. I can concentrate as well as ever. 
1. I can’t concentrate as well as usual. 
2. It’s hard to keep my mind on anything for very long. 
3. I find I can’t concentrate on anything. 
20. Tiredness or Fatigue 
0. I am no more tired or fatigued than usual. 
1. I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual. 
2. I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things I used to do. 
3. I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the things I used to do. 
21. Loss of Interest in Sex 
0. I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
1. I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
2. I am much less interested in sex now. 
3. I have lost interest in sex completely. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	102	
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
Form X1 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read 
each statement and blacken in the appropriate circle to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at 
this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one 
statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
 
1=Not at all 
2=Somewhat 
3=Moderately so 
4=Very much so 
 
1. I feel calm. 
1  2  3  4 
2. I feel secure. 
1  2  3  4 
3. I am tense. 
1  2  3  4 
 
 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
Form X2 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read 
each statement and then circle the appropriate response to indicate how you generally feel. There 
are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement, but give the 
answer which seems to describe how you general feel. 
 
1=Almost never 
2=Sometimes 
3-Often 
4=Almost always 
 
1. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind. 
1  2  3  4 
2. I am a steady person. 
1  2  3  4 
 
 
 
Please note that copyright laws state that only 5 sample items from the STAI may be 
reproduced. 
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Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory 
Instructions: Please answer each question by putting a circle around the ‘TRUE’ or the ‘FALSE’ 
following the question. There are no right or wrong answers, and no trick questions. Work 
quickly and do not think too long about the exact meaning of the question. 
 
1. I avoid using public telephones because of possible contamination.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
2. I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of them.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
3. I am more concerned than most people about honesty.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
4. I am often late because I can’t seem to get through everything on time.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
5. I don’t worry unduly about contamination if I touch an animal.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
6. I frequently have to check things (e.g., gas or water taps, doors, etc.) several times.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
7. I have a very strict conscience.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
8. I find that almost every day I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind against 
my will. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
9. I do not worry unduly if I accidently bump into somebody.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
10. I usually have serious doubts about the simple everyday things I do.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
11. Neither of my parents was very strict during my childhood.  
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TRUE 
FALSE 
 
12. I tend to get behind in my work because I repeat things over and over again.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
13. I use only an average amount of soap.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
14. Some numbers are extremely unlucky.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
15. I do not check letters over and over again before posting them.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
16. I do not take a long time to dress in a morning.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
17. I am not excessively concerned about cleanliness. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
 
18. One of my major problems is that I pay too much attention to detail. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
 
19. I can use well-kept toilets without any hesitation.  
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
20. My major problem is repeated checking. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
21. I am not unduly concerned about germs and diseases. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
22. I do not tend to check things more than once. 
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TRUE 
FALSE 
 
23. I do not stick to a very strict routine when doing ordinary things. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
24. My hands do not feel dirty after touching money. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
25. I do not usually count when doing a routine task. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
26. I take a rather long time to complete my washing in the morning. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
27. I do not use a great deal of antiseptics. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
28. I spend a lot of time every day checking things over and over again. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
29. Hanging and folding my clothes at night does not take up a lot of time. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
 
30. Even when I do something carefully I often feel that it is not quite right. 
TRUE 
FALSE
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Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale 
Please select the option that best reflects your opinion, using the rating system below. 
 
1=Strongly disagree 
2=Disagree 
3=Neither agree nor disagree 
4=Agree 
5=strongly agree 
 
1. My parents set very high standards for me. (PE) 
1  2  3  4  5 
2. Organization is very important to me. (O) 
1  2  3  4  5 
3. As a child, I was punished for doing things less than perfect. (PC) 
1  2  3  4  5 
4. If I do not set the highest standards for myself, I am likely to end up a second-rate  
person. (PS) 
1  2  3  4  5 
5. My parents never tried to understand my mistakes. (PC) 
1  2  3  4  5 
6. It is important to me that I am thoroughly competent in everything I do. (PS) 
1  2  3  4  5 
7. I am a neat person. (O) 
1  2  3  4  5 
8. I try to be an organized person. (O) 
1  2  3  4  5 
9. If I fail at work/school, I am a failure as a person. (CM) 
1  2  3  4  5 
10. I should be upset if I make a mistake. (CM) 
1  2  3  4  5 
11. My parents wanted me to do the best at everything. (PE) 
1  2  3  4  5 
12. I set higher goals than most people. (PS) 
1  2  3  4  5 
13. If someone does a task at work/school better than I, then I feel like I failed the whole 
task. (CM) 
1  2  3  4  5 
14. If I fail partly, it is as bad as being a complete failure. (CM) 
1  2  3  4  5 
15. Only outstanding performance is good enough in my family. (PE) 
1  2  3  4  5 
16. I am very good at focusing my efforts on attaining a goal. (PS) 
1  2  3  4  5 
17. Even when I do something very carefully, I often feel that it is not quite right. (D) 
1  2  3  4  5 
18. I hate being less than the best at things. (CM) 
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1  2  3  4  5 
19. I have extremely high goals. (PS) 
1  2  3  4  5 
20. My parents have expected excellence from me. (PE) 
1  2  3  4  5 
21. People will probably think less of me if I make a mistake. (CM) 
1  2  3  4  5 
22. I never felt like I could meet my parents’ expectations. (PC) 
1  2  3  4  5 
23. If I do not do as well as other people, it means I am an inferior human being. (CM) 
1  2  3  4  5 
24. Other people seem to accept lower standards than I do. (O) 
1  2  3  4  5 
25. If I do not do well all the time, people will not respect me. (CM) 
1  2  3  4  5 
26. My parents have always had higher expectations for my future than I have. (PE) 
1  2  3  4  5 
27. I try to be a neat person. (O) 
1  2  3  4  5 
28. I usually have doubts about the simple everyday things I do. (D) 
1  2  3  4  5 
29. Neatness is very important to me. (O) 
1  2  3  4  5 
30. I expect higher performance in my daily tasks than most people. (PS) 
1  2  3  4  5 
31. I am an organized person. (O) 
1  2  3  4  5 
32. I tend to get behind in my work because I repeat things over and over. (D) 
1  2  3  4  5 
33. It takes me a long time to do something “right.” (D) 
1  2  3  4  5 
34. The fewer mistakes I make, the more people will like me. (CM) 
1  2  3  4  5 
35. I never felt like I could meet my parents’ standards. (PC) 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Note. CM = Concern over Mistakes, D = Doubts about actions, PE = Parental Expectations, PC = Parental 
Criticism, PS = Personal Standards, O = Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how you control (that is, 
regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions below involve two distinct aspects of your emotional life. 
One is your emotional experience, or what you feel like inside. The other is your emotional expression, or how 
you show your emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although some of the following questions 
may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways. For each item, please answer using the 
following scale: 
 
 
1. ____ When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what 
I’m thinking about. 
2. ____ I keep my emotions to myself. 
3. ____ When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change what I’m 
thinking about. 
4. ____ When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them. 
5. ____ When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that 
helps me stay calm. 
6. ____ I control my emotions by not expressing them. 
7. ____ When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the 
situation. 
8. ____ I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in. 
9. ____ When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them. 
10. ____ When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the 
situation. 
 
Items 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10 make up the Cognitive Reappraisal facet. 
Items 2, 4, 6, 9 make up the Expressive Suppression facet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
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Rigid vs. Flexible Dieting Scale 
Flexible Control 
 
1. When I have eaten my quota of calories, I am usually good about not eating any more. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
2. I deliberately take small helpings as a means of weight control. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
3. While on a diet, if I eat food that is not allowed, I consciously eat less for a period of time 
to make up for it. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
4. I consciously hold back at meals in order not to gain weight. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
5. I pay a great deal of attention to changes in my figure. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
6. How conscious are you of what you are eating? 
NOT AT ALL 
SLIGHTLY 
MODERATELY 
EXTREMELY 
7. How likely are you to consciously eat less than you want? 
UNLIKELY 
SLIGHTLY UNLIKELY 
MODERATELY LIKELY 
VERY LIKELY 
8. If I eat a bit more on one day, I make up for it the next day. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
9. I pay attention to my figure, but I still enjoy a variety of foods. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
10. I prefer light foods that are not fattening. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
11. If I eat a little bit more during one meal, I make up for it at the next meal. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
12. Do you deliberately restrict your intake during meals even though you would like to eat 
more? 
ALWAYS 
OFTEN 
RARELY 
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NEVER 
 
Rigid Control 
1. I have a pretty good idea of the number of calories in common food. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
2. I count calories as a conscious means of controlling my weight. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
3. How often are you dieting in a conscious effort to control your weight? 
RARELY 
SOMETIMES 
USUALLY 
ALWAYS 
4. Would a weight fluctuation of 5 lb affect the way you live your life? 
NOT AT ALL 
SLIGHTLY 
MODERATELY 
VERY MUCH 
5. Do feelings of guilt about overeating help you control your food intake? 
NEVER 
RARELY 
OFTEN 
ALWAYS 
6. How frequently do you avoid “stocking up” on tempting foods? 
ALMOST NEVER 
SELDOM 
USUALLY 
ALMOST ALWAYS 
7. How likely are you to shop for low calorie foods? 
UNLIKELY 
SLIGHTLY UNLIKELY 
MODERATELY LIKELY 
VERY LIKELY 
8. I eat diet foods, even if they do not taste very good. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
9. A diet would be too boring a way for me to lose weight. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
10. I would rather skip a meal than stop eating in the middle of one. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
11. I alternate between times when I diet strictly and times when I don’t pay much attention 
to what and how much I eat. 
TRUE 
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FALSE 
12. Sometimes I skip meals to avoid gaining weight. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
13. I avoid some foods on principle even though I like them. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
14. I try to stick to a plan when I lose weight. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
15. Without a diet plan, I wouldn’t know how to control my weight. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
16. Quick success is most important for me during a diet. 
TRUE 
FALSE 
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Systemizing Quotient 
 
Response options: Strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, strongly disagree 
1. When I listen to a piece of music, I always notice the way it’s structured. 
2. I adhere to common superstitions. 
3. I often make resolutions, but find it hard to stick to them. 
4. I prefer to read non-fiction than fiction. 
5. If I were buying a car, I would want to obtain specific information about its engine 
capacity. 
6. When I look at a painting, I do not usually think about the technique involved in making 
it. 
7. If there was a problem with the electrical wiring in my home, I’d be able to fix it myself. 
8. When I have a dream, I find it difficult to remember precise details about the dream the 
next day. 
9. When I watch a film, I prefer to be with a group of friends, rather than alone. 
10. I am interested in learning about different religions. 
11. I rarely read articles or web pages about new technology. 
12. I do not enjoy games that involve a high degree of strategy. 
13. I am fascinated by how machines work. 
14. I make it a point of listening to the news each morning. 
15. In maths, I am intrigued by the rules and patterns governing numbers. 
16. I am bad about keeping in touch with old friends. 
17. When I am relating a story, I often leave out details and just give the gist of what 
happened. 
18. I find it difficult to understand instruction manuals for putting appliances together. 
19. When I look at an animal, I like to know the precise species it belongs to. 
20. If I were buying a computer, I would want to know exact details about its hard drive 
capacity and processor speed. 
21. I enjoy participating in sport. 
22. I try to avoid doing household chores if I can. 
23. When I cook, I do not think about exactly how different methods and ingredients 
contribute to the final product. 
24. I find it difficult to read and understand maps. 
25. If I had a collection (e.g., CDs, coins, stamps), it would be highly organized. 
26. When I look at a piece of furniture, I do not notice the details of how it was constructed. 
27. The idea of engaging in ‘risk-taking’ activities appeals to me. 
28. When I learn about historical events, I do not focus on exact dates. 
29. When I read the newspaper, I am drawn to tables of information, such as football league 
scores or stock market indices. 
30. When I learn a language, I become intrigued by its grammatical rules. 
31. I find it difficult to learn my way around a new city. 
32. I do not tend to watch science documentaries on television or read articles about science 
and nature. 
33. If I were buying a stereo, I would want to know about its precise technical features. 
34. I find it easy to grasp exactly how odds work in betting. 
35. I am not very meticulous when I carry out D.I.Y. 
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36. I find it easy to carry on a conversation with someone I’ve just met. 
37. When I look at a building, I am curious about the precise way it was constructed. 
38. When an election is being held, I am not interested in the results for each constituency. 
39. When I lend someone money, I expect them to pay me back exactly what they owe me. 
40. I find it difficult to understand information the bank sends me on different investment and 
saving systems. 
41. When traveling by train, i often wonder exactly how the rail networks are coordinated. 
42. When I buy a new appliance, I do not read the instruction manual very thoroughly. 
43. If I were buying a camera, I would not look carefully into the quality of the lens. 
44. When I read something, I always notice whether it is grammatically correct. 
45. When I hear the weather forecast I am not very interested in the meteorological patterns. 
46. I often wonder what it would be like to be someone else. 
47. I find it difficult to do two things at once. 
48. When I look at a mountain, I think about how precisely it was formed. 
49. I can easily visualize how the motorways in my region link up. 
50. When I’m in a restaurant, I often have a hard time deciding what to order. 
51. When I’m on a plane, I do not think about the aerodynamics. 
52. I often forget the precise details of conversations I’ve had. 
53. When I am walking in the country, I am curious about how the various kinds of trees 
differ. 
54. After meeting someone just once or twice, I find it difficult to remember precisely what 
they look like. 
55. I am interested in knowing the path a river takes from its source to the sea. 
56. I do not read legal documents very carefully. 
57. I am not interested in understanding how wireless communication works. 
58. I am curious about life on other planets. 
59. When I travel, I like to learn specific details about the culture of the place I am visiting. 
60. I do not care to know the names of the plants I see. 
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Eating Attitudes Test 
Please place an (X) under the column which applies best to each of the numbered statements. All 
of the results will be strictly confidential. Most of the questions directly relate to food or eating, 
although other types of questions have been included. Please answer each question carefully. 
Thank you. 
 
Response options: 
Always 
Very Often 
Often 
Sometimes 
Rarely 
Never 
 
1. Like eating with other people. 
2. Prepare foods for others but do not eat what I cook. 
3. Become anxious prior to eating. 
4. Am terrified about being overweight. 
5. Avoid eating when I am hungry. 
6. Find myself preoccupied with food. 
7. Have gone on eating binges where I feel that I may not be able to stop. 
8. Cut my food into small pieces. 
9. Aware of the calorie content of foods that I eat. 
10. Particularly avoid foods with a high carbohydrate content (e.g., bread, potatoes, rice, 
etc.). 
11. Feel bloated after meals. 
12. Feel that others would prefer if I ate more. 
13. Vomit after I have eaten. 
14. Feel extremely guilty after eating. 
15. Am preoccupied with a desire to be thinner. 
16. Exercise strenuously to burn off calories. 
17. Weigh myself several times a day. 
18. Like my clothes to fit tightly. 
19. Enjoy eating meat. 
20. Wake up early in the morning. 
21. Eat the same foods day after day. 
22. Think about burning up calories when I exercise. 
23. Have regular menstrual periods. 
24. Other people think that I am too thin. 
25. Am preoccupied with the thought of having fat on my body. 
26. Take longer than others to eat my meals. 
27. Enjoy eating at restaurants. 
28. Take laxatives. 
29. Avoid foods with sugar in them. 
30. Eat diet foods. 
31. Feel that food controls my life. 
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32. Display self control around food. 
33. Feel that others pressure me to eat. 
34. Give too much time and thought to food. 
35. Suffer from constipation. 
36. Feel uncomfortable after eating sweets. 
37. Engage in dieting behavior. 
38. Like my stomach to be empty. 
39. Enjoy trying new rich foods. 
40. Have the impulse to vomit after meals. 
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Demographics 
 
What is your gender? 
• Male 
• Female 
• Other 
 
How old are you? 
 
What year are you in school? 
• Freshman 
• Sophomore 
• Junior 
• Senior 
 
Are you currently diagnosed with or being treated for an eating disorder? 
• Yes 
• No 
 
Are you currently diagnosed with or being for obsessive-compulsive disorder? 
• Yes 
• No 
 
Are you currently diagnosed with or being treated for severe depression? 
• Yes 
• No 
 
Which race do you identify with (select only one): 
• African American, Black, African, Caribbean 
• East Asian (Chinese, Korean, Japanese, etc.) 
• South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, etc.) 
• Southeast Asian (Vietnamese, Cambodian, Filipino, etc.) 
• European American, White, Anglo, Caucasian 
• Hispanic American, Latino(a), Chicano(a), Mexican, Columbian 
• Pacific Islander (Micronesian, Melanesian, Samoan, etc.) 
• Native Hawaiian, American Indian, Alaskan Native 
• Biracial, Multiracial 
 
What is your ethnicity? (open-ended question) 
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International Personality Item Pool  
Representation	of	the	Goldberg	(1992)	markers	for	the	Big-Five	factor	structure	
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe 
yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as 
you are, and roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your 
responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Indicate for each statement whether it is 1. Very 
Inaccurate, 2. Moderately Inaccurate, 3. Neither Accurate Nor Inaccurate, 4. Moderately 
Accurate, or 5. Very Accurate as a description of you. 
 
1. Am the life of the party. (1+) 
2. Feel little concern for others. (2-) 
3. Am always prepared. (3+) 
4. Get stressed out easily. (4-) 
5. Have a rich vocabulary. (5+) 
6. Don’t talk a lot. (1-) 
7. Am interested in people. (2+) 
8. Leave my belongings around. (3-) 
9. Am relaxed most of the time. (4+) 
10. Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. (5-) 
11. Feel comfortable around people. (1+) 
12. Insult people. (2-) 
13. Pay attention to details. (3+) 
14. Worry about things. (4-) 
15. Have a vivid imagination. (5+) 
16. Keep in the background. (1-) 
17. Sympathize with others’ feelings. (2+) 
18. Make a mess of things. (3-) 
19. Seldom feel blue. (4+) 
20. Am not interested in abstract ideas. (5-) 
21. Start conversations. (1+) 
22. Am not interested in other people’s problems. (2-) 
23. Get chores done right away. (3+) 
24. Am easily disturbed. (4-) 
25. Have excellent ideas. (5+) 
26. Have little to say. (1-) 
27. Have a soft heart. (2+) 
28. Often forget to put things back in their proper place. (3-) 
29. Get upset easily. (4-) 
30. Do not have a good imagination. (5-) 
31. Talk to a lot of different people at parties. (1+) 
32. Am not really interested in others. (2-) 
33. Like order. (3+) 
34. Change my mood a lot. (4-) 
35. Am quick to understand things. (5+) 
36. Don’t like to draw attention to myself. (1+) 
37. Take time out for others. (2+) 
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38. Shirk my duties. (3+) 
39. Have frequent mood swings. (4-) 
40. Use difficult words. (5+) 
41. Don’t mind being the center of attention.  (1+) 
42. Feel others’ emotions. (2+) 
43. Follow a schedule. (3+) 
44. Get irritated easily. (4-) 
45. Spend time reflecting on things. (5+) 
46. Am quiet around strangers. (1-) 
47. Make people feel at ease. (2+) 
48. Am exacting in my work. (3+) 
49. Often feel blue. (4-) 
50. Am full of ideas. (5+) 
 
The numbers in parentheses after each item indicate the scale on which that item is scored 
(i.e., of the five factors: (1) Extraversion, (2) Agreeableness, (3) Conscientiousness, (4) 
Emotional Stability, or (5) Intellect/Imagination) and its direction of scoring (+ or -). These 
numbers should not be included in the actual survey questionnaire. 
 
For + keyed items, the response "Very Inaccurate" is assigned a value of 1, "Moderately 
Inaccurate" a value of 2, "Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate" a 3, "Moderately Accurate" a 
4, and "Very Accurate" a value of 5. 
  
For - keyed items, the response "Very Inaccurate" is assigned a value of 5, "Moderately 
Inaccurate" a value of 4, "Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate" a 3, "Moderately Accurate" a 
2, and "Very Accurate" a value of 1. 
  
Once numbers are assigned for all of the items in the scale, the values are summed. 
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